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Article

Globalization Without a Safety Net: The
Challenge of Protecting Cross-Border
Funding of NGOs
Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer †
INTRODUCTION
In 2017, Compassion International announced that it would
be closing its operations in India after forty-eight years and ending its services to 145,000 Indian children. 1 The reason for this
drastic action was that the Indian government was adding Compassion to the over 11,000 nongovernmental organizations
(“NGOs”) that, since 2014, had lost their required licenses to accept foreign funds. 2 Similarly, in 2015, the MacArthur Foundation announced it was closing its Moscow office after having
made more than $173 million in grants over nearly twenty-five
years to promote higher education and human rights and to limit
proliferation of weapons in Russia. 3 The Foundation did not
want to end its activities in Russia, but it stated that a series of
laws enacted by Russian lawmakers that targeted foreignfunded NGOs, culminating in those lawmakers recommending
that the Foundation be formally designated as “undesirable,”
† Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. I am very grateful for helpful
comments on earlier drafts from participants in the International Society of
Third Sector Research 12th International Conference, the Nonprofit Forum,
and the Notre Dame Faculty Colloquium, and from Andrea Bjorklund, Jimmy
Gurulé, and Mark Sidel. I am also very grateful for research assistance from
Erik Adams, Jennifer Bandeen, and Dehmeh Smith. Copyright © 2018 by Lloyd
Hitoshi Mayer.
1. Ellen Barry & Suhasini Raj, Major Christian Charity Forced To Halt
Work in India, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2017, at A4.
2. Id.; see also Noreen Ohlrich, Nonprofits Shut Down as India Cuts Off
Funding, NONPROFIT Q. (Jan. 30, 2017), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/2017/01/
30/nonprofits-shut-india-cuts-off-funding.
3. Henry Meyer, MacArthur Foundation Leaves Russia amid NGO “Witch
Hunt,” BLOOMBERG, (2015); see also The MacArthur Foundation in Russia:
1991–2015, MACARTHUR FOUND., https://www.macfound.org/tags/russia (last
visited Dec. 5, 2017).
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had forced its hand.4 These stories would be troubling enough in
isolation, but they have been repeated not only in India and Russia but also in China, Hungary, Kenya, and many other countries.5 Indeed, recent studies indicate that more than fifty countries are placing increasing restrictions on (1) domestic NGOs
that receive funding from outside their countries’ borders; and
(2) foreign NGOs that provide such funding, sharply restricting
the ability of both types of entities to pursue their legitimate
charitable endeavors. 6
Cross-border funding is a critical resource for NGOs in many
countries for a variety of reasons, including limited domestic resources and the lack of a domestic philanthropic culture. 7 At the
same time, such funding is often viewed with suspicion by the
governments of these countries (“host countries”) because they
are concerned about potential challenges to government authority, foreign influence, and possible cultural conflicts. 8 While such
concerns are generally not sufficient to justify limiting or regulating such support under international law, they provide motivations for governments to do so while publicly relying on other,
more defensible justifications, such as national security and accountability. Cross-border funders seeking to challenge such legal restrictions under international law face great difficulty doing so in most countries, however, because of the limited reach

4. Press Release, MacArthur Found., Statement of MacArthur President
Julia Stasch on the Foundation’s Russian Office (July 21, 2015), https://
www.macfound.org/press/press-releases/statement-macarthur-president-julia
-stasch-foundations-russia-office; Meyer, supra note 3.
5. See, e.g., Helene Bienvenu & Palko Karasz, In Anti-Soros Feud, Hungary Adopts Rules on Foreign-Financed Groups, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2017, at
A4; Jennifer Brass, Kenya’s Clampdown on Civil Society Is Against Its Self-Interest, CONVERSATION (July 11, 2016), http://theconversation.com/kenyas
-clampdown-on-civil-society-is-against-its-self-interest-62019; Josh Chin, New
Chinese Law Puts Foreign Nonprofits in Limbo; Many NGOs Could be Made
Illegal on Jan. 1 amid Campaign Against Unwanted Foreign Influences, WALL
ST. J. (Dec. 14, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/foreign-nonprofits-brace-for
-new-regulations-in-china-1481735054.
6. See infra note 24.
7. This appears to be particularly true for advocacy NGOs that are often
in conflict with host-country governmental authorities. See, e.g., Thomas Parks,
The Rise and Fall of Donor Funding for Advocacy NGOs: Understanding the
Impact, 18 DEV. PRAC. 213, 219 (Apr. 2008) (discussing developing countries in
Asia); Kenneth Roth, The Great Civil Society Choke-Out, FOREIGN POL’Y (Jan.
27, 2016), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/27/the-great-civil-society
-choke-out-human-rights-democracy-india-russia-china-kenya.
8. Parks, supra note 7, at 218.
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of the applicable international human rights treaties and inadequate enforcement regimes under the most directly applicable
international agreements. 9
One potentially promising avenue for closing this gap between international law and actual practice are the investment
treaties to which many host countries and the home countries of
cross-border funders are party. 10 This growing web of treaties
often define both investor and investment broadly enough to
reach at least some cross-border funding of NGOs, and also generally provide a relatively effective enforcement mechanism for
resolving disputes between investors and host countries. 11 But a
closer examination of both the jurisdictional and other hurdles
for invoking these treaties and the costs of trying to overcome
those hurdles reveals significant barriers for cross-border funders. These barriers are difficult for NGOs to overcome because
of their limited financial resources and the likely modest amount
of any possible damages they could recover, particularly in light
of recent data about the substantial financial costs incurred by
for-profit investors that seek investment treaty protection. As a
result, the promise of these treaties to protect cross-border funding of NGOs is unlikely to be fulfilled, unless ways are found to
cover or significantly reduce those costs. Furthermore, most affected NGOs presumably are not interested primarily in recovering monetary damages but are instead primarily interested in
being free to pursue their activities in the host countries, a goal
not well-suited to the usual investment treaty dispute resolution
procedures.
Absent ways to resolve these shortcomings, another alternative is to consider what lessons the successful development of the
9. A possible exception is the pending court challenge under the European
Convention on Human Rights to some of Russia’s actions in this regard. See
infra note 274 and accompanying text.
10. See Timothy C. Evered, Foreign Investment Issues for International
Non-Governmental Organizations: International Health Projects in China and
the Former Soviet Union, 3 BUFF. J. INT’L L. 153, 171–78 (1996); Nick Gallus &
Luke Eric Peterson, International Investment Treaty Protection of NGOs, 22
ARB. INT’L 527, 532–34 (2006); Sabine Konrad, Protection for Non-Profit Organizations, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 555, 557–58 (Marc Bungenberg
et al. eds., 2015); see also Gregory W. MacKenzie, Note, ICSID Arbitration as a
Strategy for Levelling the Playing Field Between International Non-Governmental Organizations and Host States, 19 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 197, 223–33
(1993) (suggesting using international arbitration, which is increasingly used
to resolve trade and cross-border investment disputes, to protect cross-border
funding of NGOs).
11. See, e.g., MacKenzie, supra note 10, at 215–16.
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investment treaty regime provides regarding the conditions that
would be needed for the development of a separate treaty framework to more robustly protect cross-border funding of NGOs. Unfortunately, it appears that such conditions do not exist currently and may not exist for many years. In their absence and
the absence of any other viable international law solution in the
foreseeable future, the remaining alternative for NGOs is to continue pursuing ad hoc, country-specific efforts to resist the increasing legal restrictions on such funding.
This Article begins by summarizing the growth of burdensome legal restrictions on cross-border funding of NGOs. It then
analyzes in Part II the promise of investment treaties to counter
such restrictions, including the jurisdictional and other significant legal hurdles to including such funding within the reach of
those treaties that may undermine that promise. Part III then
explores the financial and possible other costs of invoking investment treaty protections and explains why those substantial costs
further undermine that promise. Part IV considers two options
for salvaging the promise of international treaties to address
these restrictions. One option would be to reduce the financial
costs to NGOs of invoking existing investment treaties either
through third-party financing or by encouraging pro bono assistance, with the hope that it would then be feasible for many affected NGOs to obtain favorable arbitration decisions with respect to the jurisdictional and other legal hurdles. The other
option is to learn what factors are needed to develop momentum
for new treaties that could protect cross-border funding of NGOs
from the history of investment treaties, and to examine whether
those factors currently exist or could be developed in the foreseeable future. Unfortunately, the prospects for these options are
not bright, and therefore Part V discusses a menu of ad hoc,
country-specific methods for resisting restrictions on such funding that have proven successful in some instances.
I. THE “CLOSING SPACE” FOR NGOS
A. THRESHOLD ISSUES
One threshold issue when considering cross-border funding
of NGOs is how to define nongovernmental organization, especially for purposes of international law. 12 Domestic legal definitions vary, but scholars who have considered the issue typically
12. See Gregor Zymek, Too Invested in Politics? - Advocacy and State Funding as Limits of NGO Claimants in Investor-State Arbitration 10–12 (Aug. 15,
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define nongovernmental organization or related terms such as
nonprofit by the characteristics that tend to be shared across
countries and serve to distinguish such entities from businesses,
governments, and families, including not distributing profits to
owners and voluntary participation.13 For purposes of this Article, it is sufficient to identify NGOs as legal entities under the
applicable domestic law that (1) do not have profit-seeking as
their primary motivation (as distinct from businesses); (2) are
not governmental entities (although they may receive significant
government funding); and (3) for which involvement by individuals is generally voluntary. 14
Another threshold issue is the significance of cross-border
funding of NGOs, in terms of both its amount and impact. Turning first to amount, it is difficult to do more than roughly estimate the extent of cross-border funding of NGOs annually, because there are no official compilations of such funding. Overall
development aid (defined broadly) from both governmental and
private sources appears to be slightly more than $200 billion annually.15 Of this amount, incomplete data based on information
from thirty-nine countries indicates that private giving (including from individuals and businesses, as well as NGOs, and to
governments as well as to host country NGOs) was slightly more
2016) (unpublished LL.M. research project, McGill University) (on file with author) (discussing the lack of legal definition under international law).
13. See, e.g., LESTER M. SALAMON & HELMUT K. ANHEIER, DEFINING THE
NONPROFIT SECTOR: A CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS 33–34 (1997) (identifying
five common characteristics of nonprofits: organized, private, non-profit-distributing, self-governing, and voluntary); Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, The “Independent”
Sector: Fee-for-Service Charity and the Limits of Autonomy, 65 VAND. L. REV.
51, 55–56 (2012) (describing common characteristics of nonprofits); Lester M.
Salamon & S. Wojciech Sokolowski, Beyond Nonprofits: Re-conceptualizing the
Third Sector, 27 VOLUNTAS 1515, 1517–18 (2016) (describing common characteristics of nonprofits); Michael Bernhard et al., The Varieties of Democracy Core
Civil Society Index 7–8 (The Varieties of Democracy Inst., Working Paper Series
2015:13, 2015), https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/47/2e/472eec11-830f
-4578-9a09-d9f8d43cee3a/v-dem_working_paper_2015_13_edited.pdf (identifying civil society organizations as “groups of self-organized interested citizens”
acting in pursuit of those citizens’ interests broadly conceived and distinct from
groups engaged in purely spiritual or economic activity).
14. This broad definition avoids the potential trap of limiting NGOs only to
organizations that promote certain (generally Global North) values. See Thomas
Kelley, Wait! That’s Not What We Meant by Civil Society!: Questioning the NGO
Orthodoxy in West Africa, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 993, 1000–02 (2011).
15. HUDSON INST., THE INDEX OF GLOBAL PHILANTHROPY AND REMITTANCES 2016, at 6 (2016); Anup Shah, Foreign Aid for Development Assistance,
GLOBAL ISSUES (last updated Sept. 28, 2014), http://www.globalissues.org/
article/35/foreign-aid-development-assistance#Sidenoteonprivatecontributions.
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than $60 billion in 2014.16 Of course not all cross-border funding
of NGOs necessarily falls within the term development aid, even
defined broadly, so these are very rough figures. They nevertheless indicate that such funding totals annually at least tens of
billions of dollars and possibly significantly more.
The impact of such funding is even more difficult to determine. Most commentators assume that such funding has positive
effects on the recipient NGOs and the populations of their host
countries, both with respect to meeting basic human needs and
with respect to promoting human rights and democracy. 17 But
while there are numerous studies that focus on the impact of
NGOs in a specific area (education, health care) or in a specific
country, more comprehensive evaluations are generally lacking.
Some funders, particularly larger ones, commission evaluations
of their own efforts, but outsiders often criticize such evaluations
as biased and incomplete. 18 The area where it appears there
have been the most robust attempts to measure the overall impact of efforts that often receive cross-border funding is with respect to specific methods of international development, but even
in this context such comprehensive studies are still very much
in their infancy and face significant obstacles. 19 As a result, some
commentators question the extent to which such funding has
positive effects on the recipient domestic NGOs, and through
them their host countries. 20 The strength of any positive effects
16. HUDSON INST., supra note 15, at 6.
17. For a thoughtful consideration of this assumption with respect to promoting democracy, see generally FUNDING VIRTUE: CIVIL SOCIETY AID AND DEMOCRACY PROMOTION (Marina Ottaway & Thomas Carothers eds., 2000).
18. Compare, e.g., Robert Klara, Infographic: A Look at the Millions of Lives
Saved and Improved by the Gates Foundation, ADWEEK (June 1, 2016), http://
www.adweek.com/brand-marketing/infographic-look-millions-lives-saved-and
-improved-gates-foundation-171643 (depicting the foundation’s positive contribution to global health and development), with, e.g., Julia Belluz, The Media
Loves the Gates Foundation. These Experts Are More Skeptical, VOX
(June 10, 2015), http://www.vox.com/2015/6/10/8760199/gates-foundation
-criticism (challenging the foundation’s “lack of transparency, its veto power
over other global health institutions, and its spending priorities”).
19. See Henrik Hansen & Neda Trifković, Means to an End: The Importance
of the Research Question for Systematic Reviews in International Development,
27 EUR. J. DEV. RES. 707, 717–20 (2015); Richard Mallett et al., The Benefits
and Challenges of Using Systematic Reviews in International Development Research, 4 J. DEV. EFFECTIVENESS 445, 453 (2012).
20. See, e.g., Nicola Banks et al., NGOs, States, and Donors Revisited: Still
Too Close for Comfort?, 66 WORLD DEV. 707, 710–13 (2014); Peter Nunnenkamp
& Hannes Öhler, Funding, Competition and the Efficiency of NGOs: An Empirical Analysis of Non-charitable Expenditure of US NGOs Engaged in Foreign
Aid, 65 KYKLOS 81, 81–82 (2012); Michael Hobbes, Stop Trying To Save the
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may also be dependent on conditions beyond the control of
NGOs, such as the extent of other freedoms in a given country. 21
And of course trying to separate the flows of funding of particular
interest in this Article—from foreign NGOs to domestic NGOs—
is also difficult.
Even given these limitations, and while undoubtedly some
of the funding has little positive impact or may even have a negative impact on the recipient NGOs and their host countries,
even critical observers tend to conclude that a substantial
amount of cross-border funding for NGOs is positively affecting
education, health, and other metrics that the funders, the recipients, and host-country governments generally agree are desirable. 22 In addition and as detailed below, permitting such funding
is an aspect of the generally recognized right to freedom of association.23 Unnecessary restrictions on such funding are therefore
likely both to have a negative impact on host country populations
in the aggregate and to violate recognized international human
rights; if the restrictions are severe enough to sharply curtail or
even end such funding, both that impact and that violation will
almost certainly be significant.
B. INCREASING LEGAL RESTRICTIONS ON CROSS-BORDER
FUNDING OF NGOS
Numerous articles, reports, and studies have documented
the increasing use over the past decade of legal restrictions to
create significant administrative and reputational burdens for
domestic NGOs that receive cross-border funding and for the foreign NGOs that provide such funding. More specifically, Maina
World: Big Ideas Are Destroying International Development, NEW REPUBLIC
(Nov. 17, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/article/120178/problem-international
-development-and-plan-fix-it.
21. See, e.g., Nuno S. Themudo, Reassessing the Impact of Civil Society:
Nonprofit Sector, Press Freedom, and Corruption, 26 GOVERNANCE 63, 66–70
(2013); Anna Lührmann et al., Constraining Governments: New Indices of Vertical, Horizontal and Diagonal Accountability 19, 25, 28 (Varieties of Democracy
Inst., Working Paper Series 2017:46, 2017), https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_
public/9f/ff/9fffb5f8-9399-4e3d-ba60-f8341c177343/v-dem_working_paper_2017
_46.pdf.
22. See, e.g., Banks et al., supra note 20, at 712–13; see also Michael Bernhard et al., Institutional Subsystems and the Survival of Democracy: Do Political
and Civil Society Matter? 24 (Varieties of Democracy Inst., Working Paper Series 2015:4, 2015), https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/b2/08/b208c64e
-53e1-4203-bb34-5f3adc8674c0/v-dem_working_paper_2015_4.pdf (explaining
empirical work indicating the positive effect of civil society on the survival of
democratic forms of governance).
23. Infra notes 72–78 and accompanying text.
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Kiai, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Rights to
Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association from 2011 to
2017; Thomas Carothers of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; and David Moore and Douglas Rutzen of the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, among others, have
documented this development. 24 The issue has become high profile enough to attract not only significant media coverage but
also the attention of the U.S. Congress and a prominent Washington, D.C. think tank.25
Russia is often cited as one of the first countries to take this
approach, with its enactment of burdensome registration requirements and expanded government supervisory powers for
noncommercial organizations in 2006 in the wake of the color
revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine. 26 It then enhanced these requirements in 2012 with a law requiring Russian organizations
to register as foreign agents if they receive foreign assistance
and intend to attempt to change government policy. 27 On its face,
24. Maina Kiai (Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful
Assembly and of Association), Report on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association, ¶¶ 8–42, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/39 (Apr. 24, 2013);
THOMAS CAROTHERS, THE CLOSING SPACE CHALLENGE: HOW ARE FUNDERS RESPONDING? 4–8 (2015); THOMAS CAROTHERS & SASKIA BRECHENMACHER, CLOSING SPACE: DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS SUPPORT UNDER FIRE 7–14 (2014);
Int’l Ctr. for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) & World Movement for Democracy Secretariat at the Nat’l Endowment for Democracy (NED), Defending Civil Society,
14 INT’L J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L. 5, 27–30 (2012); David Moore & Douglas Rutzen,
Legal Framework for Global Philanthropy: Barriers and Opportunities, 13 INT’L
J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L. 5, 17–25 (2011); see also BARBARA UNMÜßIG, CIVIL SOCIETY UNDER PRESSURE – SHRINKING – CLOSING – NO SPACE 4–8 (2016), https://
www.boell.de/sites/default/files/uploads/2015/12/20160601_civil_socieity_under
_pressure_shrinking_spaces_englisch.pdf.
25. See Global Philanthropy and Remittances and International Development: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Multilateral, Int’l Dev., Multilateral
Inst., and Int’l Econ., Energy, and Envtl. Policy of the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 115th Cong. (2017), https://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/global
-philanthropy-and-remittances-and-international-development-050317 (including testimony relating to restrictions on cross-border funding); Threats to Civil
Society Around the World: Hearing Before the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, 115th Cong. (2017), https://humanrightscommission.house.gov/events/
hearings/threats-civil-society-around-world; Celebrating Global Philanthropy,
HUDSON INST., http://www.hudson.org/events/1397-celebrating-global
-philanthropy32017 (last visited Dec. 5, 2017) (focusing in part on “government
crackdowns on non-profits and cross-border financial flows”).
26. Natalia Bourjaily, Some Issues Related to Russia’s New NGO Law, 8
INT’L J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L. 4, 5–6 (2006).
27. CAROTHERS & BRECHENMACHER, supra note 24, at 1–2, 12; Oonagh B.
Breen, Allies or Adversaries? Foundation Responses to Government Policing of
Cross-Border Charity, 17 INT’L J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L. 45, 63 n.85 (2015); Kiai,
supra note 24, at 9.
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a registration requirement for entities may not seem onerous,
and Russian officials even defended the requirement by stating
it was based on a long-standing United States registration law. 28
In practice, however, the requirement has led many entities with
foreign connections, including the Russian arm of the MacArthur Foundation, to cease their activities in Russia completely. 29
The term foreign agent also has a strong stigmatizing effect in
Russia, as it is commonly understood to mean foreign spy, which
has tended to deter domestic support for registered NGOs, even
as domestic requests for assistance from the same NGOs continue unabated.30 Failure to accept that label can trigger the application of substantial fines.31
As another example, China has recently shifted oversight of
foreign NGOs to the Ministry of Public Security, China’s internal
security agency, as well as imposing a burdensome registration
process on such NGOs and limiting the areas—both subject matter and geographic—in which they can operate. 32 These new legal rules require any foreign NGO seeking to operate in China
to partner with an approved domestic NGO, a requirement that
can be difficult to satisfy. 33 And the Chinese government has
been slow to provide guidance to foreign NGOs on how to comply
with the new law, leading some legal experts and nonprofit staff
to speculate that it is doing so intentionally to render such

28. Ingrid Burke, “Foreign Agents” Under Russia’s NGO Law and Its US
Doppelganger, RUSSIAN LEGAL INFO. AGENCY (July 27, 2012), http://www
.rapsinews.com/legislation_publication/20120727/263954264.html.
29. See AMNESTY INT’L, AGENTS OF THE PEOPLE: FOUR YEARS OF “FOREIGN
AGENTS” LAW IN RUSSIA: CONSEQUENCES FOR THE SOCIETY 1–6 (2016) (providing case studies illustrating the effect of Russia’s 2012 law on Russian NGOs);
Meyer, supra note 3.
30. See AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 29, at 6; Françoise Daucé, The Duality
of Coercion in Russia: Cracking Down on “Foreign Agents”, 23 DEMOKRATIZATSIYA 57, 58 (2015); Françoise Daucé, The Government and Human Rights
Groups in Russia: Civilized Oppression?, 10 J. CIV. SOC’Y 239, 242–43 (2014);
Galina Goncharenko, Essays on Financial Accountability of Human Rights Organizations 138–41 (June 2016) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Norwegian
School of Economics), http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/64693/1/Goncharenko_IRRR_
Essays%20on%20financial%20accountability_PhD%20dissertation_14.09.pdf.
31. See AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 29, at 4, 31.
32. See The China NGO Project: About the China NGO Project, CHINAFILE,
http://www.chinafile.com/ngo/about (last visited Dec. 5, 2017); Civic Freedom
Monitor: China, INT’L CTR. FOR NOT-FOR-PROFIT LAW (ICNL), [hereinafter
ICNL China], http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/china.html (last updated
June 9, 2017).
33. Chin, supra note 5.

1214

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[102:1205

groups technically illegal and therefore easier to control or expel.34 It also has been slow to register foreign NGOs since the
law went into effect at the beginning of 2017, with only ninety
registered during the first five months. 35
But these two countries are far from alone in this regard, as
more than fifty countries have imposed such measures in recent
years.36 The emergence of these restrictions is particularly disheartening given the previous optimism regarding the growing,
positive influence of NGOs in many countries with the end of the
Cold War, the spread of technology, and other recent developments.37 In many countries these measures are particularly
harmful to the domestic NGOs that relied on this support because they lack significant domestic support, usually because of
a combination of potential donors’ fears of retaliation for supporting the human rights or democratization efforts of the NGOs
and the lack of a domestic philanthropic culture. 38
Only a handful of fully authoritarian governments have
taken more extreme steps, such as dissolving or taking over
many domestic NGOs.39 For example, in 2017 Egypt enacted a
new law governing all NGOs that imposes stringent registration
requirements enforced by heavy criminal penalties, which is
widely viewed as an attack on the very existence of such organizations. 40 But subtler and, therefore, easier to justify restrictions
34. Chris Buckley, Uncertainty over New Chinese Law Rattles Foreign Nonprofits, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/29/
world/asia/china-foreign-ngo.html; Chin, supra note 5.
35. ICNL China, supra note 32.
36. CAROTHERS & BRECHENMACHER, supra note 24, at 7, 61; Darin Christensen & Jeremy M. Weinstein, Defunding Dissent: Restrictions on Aid to
NGOs, 24 J. DEMOCRACY 77, 80 (2013); Kendra Dupuy et al., Hands Off My
Regime! Governments’ Restrictions on Foreign Aid to Non-Governmental Organizations in Poor and Middle-Income Countries, 84 WORLD DEV. 299, 302 (2016).
37. See CAROTHERS & BRECHENMACHER, supra note 24, at 2; Banks et al.,
supra note 20, at 707; Gerard Clarke, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)
and Politics in the Developing World, 46 POL. STUD. 36, 36 (1998); Jessica T.
Matthews, Power Shift: The Rise of Global Civil Society, 76 FOREIGN AFFS. 50,
50–67 (1997); Douglas Rutzen, Aid Barriers and the Rise of Philanthropic Protectionism, 17 INT’L J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L. 3, 5–6 (2015).
38. See, e.g., AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 29, at 5–6; JOHN CASEY, THE NONPROFIT WORLD: CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE RISE OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 200
(2015).
39. CAROTHERS & BRECHENMACHER, supra note 24, at 6–7.
40. Declan Walsh, Egypt’s President Enacts Law Placing Severe Restrictions on Aid Groups, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2017, at A4; see also Aswat
Masriya, Egypt: Political Parties, Rights Groups Reject NGO Law, ALLAFRICA
(Nov. 15, 2016), http://allafrica.com/stories/201611151106.html (citing a joint
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are more widespread, including in countries with governments
usually characterized as semiauthoritarian or even relatively
democratic. 41 For example, India in 2010 passed a law imposing
additional administrative requirements on domestic NGOs receiving foreign assistance and prohibiting foreign funding for
any organizations of a “political nature,”42 and Hungary in 2017
passed legislation to require domestic NGOs that receive foreign
funding to publicly identify themselves and their donors, a step
that many critics saw as part of a larger government effort to
stigmatize and discredit such NGOs.43
The specific legal restrictions on domestic NGOs receiving
cross-border funding include: (1) significant additional registration and reporting obligations, sometimes including having to
register in a manner that stigmatizes the NGO (Hungary, Indonesia, Russia); (2) requiring advance government approval before accepting or seeking such funding (Belarus, India, Jordan);
(3) significant taxes or the imposition of highly unfavorable exchange rates on such funding (Russia, Zimbabwe); (4) requiring
such funding to be routed through government channels or to
only be used for certain activities (Bolivia, Eritrea); (5) limiting
the amount of such funding to a certain percentage of a domestic
NGO’s budget (Ethiopia); and (6) prohibiting receipt of such
funding for NGOs engaged in certain activities, which are often
defined vaguely (India, Venezuela).44 The legal restrictions on
statement from numerous political parties and civil society organizations stating the law, prior to approval, would set “a dangerous precedent” and treats
“civil society as an enemy to be defeated through secret plots and laws”).
41. CAROTHERS & BRECHENMACHER, supra note 24, at 6–7 (stating semiauthoritarian regimes constitute the “majority” of governments engaged in
pushback against NGOs, but that even “relatively democratic governments”
have “recently taken or seriously considered measures” to restrict NGOs); see
also Helmet K. Anheier, Discussion Paper, Civil Society Challenged: Towards
an Enabling Policy Environment, ECONOMICS 1, 10–11 (2017), http://www
.economics-ejournal.org/economics/discussionpapers/2017-45/file (proposing a
G20-initiated independent commission to address state-civil society relations,
including with respect to the shrinking space for civil society in some countries
both within and outside of the G20).
42. CAROTHERS & BRECHENMACHER, supra note 24, at 9; see also Moore &
Rutzen, supra note 24, at 20, 23 (discussing the restrictions India already imposed on domestic NGOs prior to the 2010 law).
43. Bienvenu & Karasz, supra note 5 (noting that, in addition to the law
that critics state is meant to “stigmatize, discredit, and intimidate” NGOs, the
Hungarian Government has also circulated biased questionnaires claiming certain NGOs are dangerous “to [Hungary’s] independence”).
44. See CAROTHERS & BRECHENMACHER, supra note 24, at 8–11; UNMÜßIG,
supra note 24, at 6–9, 12; Dupuy et al., supra note 36, at 311; Moore & Rutzen,
supra note 24, at 7, 18–25; Rutzen, supra note 37, at 9–20.
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foreign NGOs providing such funding include: (1) repeated and
burdensome investigation of such funders (Kazakhstan, Russia);
(2) refusing to register such NGOs and then accusing the NGOs
of violating host country registration requirements (Jordan); (3)
criminal prosecution of foreign NGO representatives (Egypt);
and (4) expulsion from the host country (Azerbaijani, Ethiopia). 45 Such legal rules are in addition to the creation of a hostile
political environment for such funders and the domestic NGOs
they support through critical public comments by senior government officials and government-controlled communication outlets,46 and the imposition of more general legal barriers on the
creation and operation of domestic NGOs. 47
In some countries, the restrictions vary based on the type of
activity funded, with NGOs engaged in advocacy or human
rights related activities more likely to be targeted, as opposed to
NGOs engaged in less controversial activities, such as the provision of social services. 48 Not all restrictions are so finally tuned,
however. For example, the Russian laws discussed above have
hit not only NGOs engaged primarily in the former types of activities but also a charity involved in combating drug addiction
and the spread of HIV (although the government also accuses of
it of engaging in political activities). 49 Similarly, the Turkish
45. See CAROTHERS & BRECHENMACHER, supra note 24, at 12–15.
46. Id. at 11–12.
47. Survey of Trends Affecting Civic Space: 2015–16, GLOBAL TRENDS IN
NGO LAW, Sept. 2016, at 2; see also BEN HAYES ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL INSTITUTE, ON “SHRINKING SPACE”: A FRAMING PAPER 3 (Apr. 2017), https://www
.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/on_shrinking_space_2.pdf (noting NGOs
have recently been galvanized to understand and counter “shrinking space”);
ICNL & NED, supra note 24, at 13 (listing a host of legal barriers facing NGOs);
Moore & Rutzen, supra note 24, at 25–27 (discussing “legal barriers that impede
the development” of domestic NGOs that receive cross border funding).
48. See KATERINA HADZI-MICEVA EVANS, CONFERENCE OF INGOS OF THE
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EXPERT COUNCIL ON NGO LAW, REGULATING POLITICAL
ACTIVITIES OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, OING Conf/Exp ¶¶ 1–5,
46 (2015), https://rm.coe.int/1680640fc2 (noting that in some countries any advocacy or human rights work done by an NGO would fall under broad restrictions against “political activity”); Zymek, supra note 12, at 9 (stating one of
the main arguments made against cross-border funded NGOs is that they advocate for a destabilization of government); Foreign Funding of NGOs: Donors:
Keep Out, ECONOMIST (Sept. 12, 2014), https://www.economist.com/news/
international/21616969-more-and-more-autocrats-are-stifling-criticism
-barring-non-governmental-organisations (stating that “NGOs focused on democracy-building or human rights are the most affected” by laws that limit
cross-border funding).
49. See Ivan Watson et al., On the Front Lines of Russia’s “Staggering” HIV
Epidemic, CNN (June 8, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/06/health/russia
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government recently revoked the registration of Mercy Corps,
forcing the U.S. charity, which is heavily involved in helping Syrian civilians, to end its operations in Turkey.50
The apparent advantage that most of these legal restrictions
have over more draconian measures, such as wholesale closure
of NGOs and seizure of their assets and records, is that such restrictions are easier to justify, thereby reducing exposure to negative international consequences that are likely to be triggered
by blunter approaches. The countries that impose these restrictions often publicly argue for them based on a variety of concerns, including promoting transparency and accountability, ensuring cultural sensitivity and limiting cultural conflicts,
controlling development priority setting, and combatting terrorism.51 Such concerns are certainly legitimate; for example, the
risks of NGOs serving as conduits for financing terrorism has
been well documented,52 although NGOs are not necessarily at
greater risk in this regard than other types of entities. 53 In part
for this reason, in many instances government officials appear
-hiv-epidemic/index.html (noting the Russian government’s decision to label the
Rylkov Foundation a Foreign Agent, due to cross-border funding, has put its
operation at risk).
50. Karen DeYoung & Dan Lamothe, Turkey Shuts Down a U.S. Aid Group
That Helped Syrians, WASH. POST (Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/world/turkey-shuts-down-a-us-aid-group-that-helped-syrians/2017/03/07/
e510d272-0374-11e7-9d14-9724d48f5666_story.html; Rick Gladstone, Turkey
Halts U.S. Charity That Aids Over 500,000 Syrians a Month, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/08/world/middleeast/turkey-syria
-mercy-corps.html.
51. ICNL & NED, supra note 24, at 31–32; Kiai, supra note 24, at 8–13;
Douglas Rutzen, Civil Society Under Assault, 26 J. DEMOCRACY 28, 31–33
(2015).
52. See, e.g., GEOFFREY CORN ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 402–19
(2015) (discussing economic sanctions and terrorist financing, and noting that
the U.S. government designated over forty “purported charities” suspected of
“providing financial support to terrorists or terrorist organizations”); JIMMY GURULÉ, UNFUNDING TERROR: THE LEGAL RESPONSE TO THE FINANCING OF
GLOBAL TERRORISM 117–47 (2008) (discussing “corrupt Islamic charities” noting that they have been “one of the most important sources of funds” for many
terrorist organizations); Matthew Levitt, Charitable Organizations and Terrorist Financing: A War on Terror Status-Check, WASH. INST. (Mar. 19, 2004),
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/charitable
-organizations-and-terrorist-financing-a-war-on-terror-status-che (discussing
charitable organizations that act as fronts for international terror groups).
53. See Rebecca Cooney, Charities Are “Not Inherently at Risk of Terrorist
Abuse,” Financial Action Task Force Says, THIRD SECTOR (June 30, 2016),
http://www.thirdsector.co.uk/charities-not-inherently-risk-terrorist-abuse
-financial-action-task-force-says/finance/article/1400767 (noting a global body
that “sets counter-terrorism financing standards” stated “charities are not inherently at risk of terrorist abuse”).

1218

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[102:1205

sincerely to believe that the new rules are necessary to address
these concerns. 54
The reasons why these restrictions have attracted such
sharp criticism, however, is that they often go well beyond what
is required to address these concerns, including because of broad
grants of discretionary power to government officials that effectively cut off foreign support of domestic NGOs without sufficient
justification. For example, failure to register under the pejorative label “foreign agent[]” in Russia has led not only to warnings
and court actions, but also substantial fines.55 In China, even
before the most recent round of legal changes there was a system
of “graduated controls” under which government authorities
could arbitrarily penalize or even shut down NGOs that engaged
in disapproved activities. 56 As a result, these new restrictions
have often proven to be quite effective in dissuading domestic
NGOs from seeking such funding or using it for disfavored activities, and foreign NGOs from providing it, causing shifts in the
activities of NGOs and, in some instances, their closure. 57 In contrast, less controversial laws in other countries, such as the U.S.
Foreign Agents Registration Act that requires the registration of
persons who act in the interests of a foreign principal and at the
direction of that foreign principal (including receiving a major
part of the person’s financing from that foreign principal), tend
to be more limited in scope, not designed to stigmatize or delegitimize the affected entities, and weakly enforced. 58
Even laws that on their face may appear reasonable and so
consistent with international law often are more troubling when
considered in context, including government statements and
other actions demonstrating hostility toward some or all NGOs.
For example, the recent Hungarian legislation noted earlier requiring NGOs receiving cross-border funding to identify themselves and their donors has drawn criticism in part because of
54. See, e.g., CAROTHERS, supra note 24, at 21 (noting in some cases governments are sincerely attempting to address terrorist financing concerns “but
fail to strike a balance with other priorities”).
55. CAROTHERS & BRECHENMACHER, supra note 24, at 20.
56. Shawn Shieh, Mapping the Dynamics of Civil Society in China, in NGO
GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT IN CHINA 45, 53 (Reza Hasmath & Jennifer
Y.J. Hsu eds., 2016).
57. ICNL & NED, supra note 24, at 19–20; Kiai, supra note 24, at 5.
58. See Foreign Agents Registration Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 611–621 (2012); Jahad Atieh, Comment, Foreign Agents: Updating FARA To Protect American Democracy, 31 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1051, 1061–63, 1067 (2010) (discussing FARA’s
effect and scope while noting enforcement by the Department of Justice has
been “abysmal”).
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long-standing concerns regarding the current government’s apparent hostility to human rights. 59 For this reason, commentators have concluded that many of these restrictions on cross-border funding are actually motivated by the desire to silence critics
and maintain power.60
It is important to note, however, that these restrictions usually do not reach domestic NGOs that avoid foreign support or
other foreign connections, although some countries have also
targeted NGOs more generally. 61 In fact, many of the countries
imposing restrictions relating to cross-border funding of NGOs
are at the same time encouraging the growth of purely domestic
NGOs that engage in activities the government deems to be beneficial for society. 62 For example, China has actively supported a
sharp increase in the number of NGOs that provide domestic social services and promote social enterprise. 63 It has also seen an
increase in registered NGOs generally, from no more than a couple thousand in the late 1980s to more than 600,000 in 2014,64

59. See, e.g., EUR. PARL. DOC. (RSP 2656) (2017) (detailing human rights
concerns in Hungary).
60. See THOMAS CAROTHERS, CLOSING SPACE AND FRAGILITY, FRAGILITY
STUDY GROUP 2–3 (Oct. 2015), https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Fragility
-Report-Policy-Brief-Closing-Space-and-Fragility.pdf (discussing the rise of civil
society organizations and “power holders” attempts to “put the civil society genie back in the bottle”).
61. For examples of the latter, see Benjamin Novak, Daggers Are Out for
Civil Society in Hungary, BUDAPEST BEACON (Jan. 12, 2017), https://www
.budapestbeacon.com/daggers-civil-society-hungary (noting the push by the
Orbán government to denigrate and oust civil society organizations); Noreen
Ohlrich, NGOs Fear the Forcible Shrinking of Civil Society in Poland, NONPROFIT Q. (Dec. 7, 2016), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/2016/12/07/ngos-fear
-forcible-shrinking-civil-society-poland (discussing the potential effects of a bill
designed to create a “Civil Society Department” to “oversee and centralize the
public funding of charities”); see also ICNL & NED, supra note 24, at 14–21
(listing examples of countries imposing legal restrictions that either create barriers to forming new NGOs or restrict legitimate activities of NGOs).
62. See CASEY, supra note 38, at 292 (stating that some authoritarian regimes “denounce [NGOs] as instruments of extremist special interests” yet
many of those same regimes have benefited by “organizing through [NGOs]”).
63. Shieh, supra note 56, at 52–53; Mark Sidel, Regulation of Nonprofit and
Philanthropic Organizations: An International Perspective, NONPROFIT Q. (July
25, 2016), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/2016/07/25/regulation-nonprofit
-philanthropy-international-non-profit-organizations.
64. Zhang Yuanfeng, Presentation at CCSS, JHU, Opening or Closing the
Space for Civil Society in China? Two Tales of a Reality, at 4 (Feb. 11, 2016),
http://ccss.jhu.edu/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2016/02/Zhang_Seminar_2
.11.2016.pdf; see also CASEY, supra note 38, at 295 (reporting similar figures).
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and there may be millions of additional, unregistered NGOs. 65
Similarly, India has seen an increase in registered NGOs from
144,000 in 1970 to more than a million after 2000. 66 In Russia
the government has taken steps to support NGOs that provide
social services, even while imposing the restrictions noted previously on NGOs that receive cross-border funding.67 While difficult to measure for a variety of reasons, including varying compliance with registration rules and changes in such rules over
time, there are relatively strong data indicating that the number
of NGOs is increasing in many, if not most, countries.68 This may
be why the most comprehensive current measure of the strength
of civil society (defined in a manner consistent with the definition of NGO used in this article, except not including political
parties or religious organizations primarily focused on spiritual
practices), the Varieties of Democracies (V-Dem) Core Civil Society Index, does not indicate a sharp decline in such strength in
any world region in recent years (through 2012). 69 At the same
time, however, it does show a recent, sharp decline in at least
one country (Russia) that has been increasingly restrictive with
respect to cross-border funding of NGOs. 70
The “closing space” narrative is therefore not simply a story
of governments seeking to shut down NGOs for reasons that
clearly violate international law. It is rather a story of governments picking and choosing which types of NGOs to favor and
disfavor, often based in large part on connections to foreign funders, and then ratcheting up otherwise legitimate registration,
reporting, and other requirements to a point where the disfavored NGOs are forced to abandon their disliked activities and
65. See Wang Xinsong et al., Giving in China: An Emerging Nonprofit Sector Embedded Within a Strong State, in THE PALGRAVE HANDBOOK OF GLOBAL
PHILANTHROPY 354, 355 (Pamela Wiepking & Femida Handy eds., 2015) (estimating the total number of registered and unregistered NGOs in China “range
between two and four million”).
66. CASEY, supra note 38, at 22.
67. See Irina Mersianova et al., Giving in Russia: The Difficult Shaping of
the New Nonprofit Regime, in THE PALGRAVE HANDBOOK OF GLOBAL PHILANTHROPY, supra note 65, at 249, 252.
68. See CASEY, supra note 38, at 21–22 (noting that while definitive figures
are unavailable and “growth may not be constant . . . the upward trend [in
NGOs] is the norm around the world”).
69. See Bernhard et al., supra note 13, at 7–8, 14–16 fig.4 (explaining how
the Index is calculated and showing civil society strength by region based on VDem’s calculation).
70. Id. at 19–20 fig.7 (noting the sharp decline since 2000 corresponds to
Putin’s rule, which subjected civil society organizations to the “heavy hand of
the state”).
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disfavored funding sources, or even to cease their operations entirely.71 It is also complicated by the difficulty of demonstrating
that such restrictions are unduly burdensome when purportedly
based on legitimate government interests. The next Section explains why such burdensome legal requirements are contrary to
international law and yet are difficult to challenge under existing international human rights treaties.
C. THE GAP BETWEEN LAW AND PRACTICE
Numerous agreements, resolutions, and court decisions involving internationally recognized human rights have implications for the ability of NGOs to receive funding and other resources, including across borders. 72 More specifically, Article 20
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that
“[e]veryone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and
association.” 73 Building on this right, Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the “Covenant”)
limits the restrictions that may be placed on the exercise of free-

71. See, e.g., Deyong Yin, China’s Attitude Toward Foreign NGOs, 8 WASH.
U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 521, 536 (2009) (“[T]he state seeks to foster certain
types of foreign NGOs and to quell those with politically sensitive agendas.”);
Jamie Dettmer, Aid Groups Fear Mass Expulsion of Western NGOs from Turkey,
VOICE OF AM. (Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.voanews.com/a/aid-gropus-fear
-mass-expulsion-of-western-ngos-from-turkey/3760749.html (quoting a U.N.
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs read-out stating that the
Turkish government was likely to use a planned requirement that all international NGOs resubmit registration requests as a “way to choose which organizations they want to keep in the country”).
72. See CAROTHERS & BRECHENMACHER, supra note 24, at 41–42 (discussing the right to freedom of association “guaranteed by multiple international
human rights agreements” and its effect on NGOs); ICNL & NED, supra note
24, at 36–56 (discussing international principles designed to “protect civil society from repressive intrusions of government”); Kiai, supra note 24, at 7–13
(noting that constraining NGOs from receiving foreign funding does not comply
with Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights);
Rutzen, supra note 37, at 33–42 (discussing the international legal framework
effecting NGOs cross-border funding); Josel Nivera Mostajo, Access to Justice
and the Right to an Effective Remedy in International Human Rights Law and
International Investment Arbitration: The Case of International Non-Governmental and Non-Profit Organizations 20–26 (May 10, 2013) (unpublished LL.M.
thesis, University of Notre Dame) (on file with author) (discussing a variety of
internationally recognized rights NGOs may claim and potential ways to enforce said rights).
73. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 20,
(Dec. 10, 1948).
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dom of association to those “prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society,” 74 and this protection likely extends to restrictions relating to accessing financial and other resources from both domestic and foreign sources. 75 Similarly,
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 53/144, commonly
known as the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights Defenders, provides in its Article 13 that everyone has the right,
both individually and in association with others, to seek and receive resources for the purpose of protecting human rights and
fundamental freedoms through peaceful means. 76 Other resolutions by both the United Nations General Assembly and the
United Nations Human Rights Council elaborate further on the
right to seek and receive needed resources to vindicate freedom
of association. 77 Finally, a number of regional bodies have also
recognized this right under international law, including within
the regional human rights systems established in the Americas
and Europe.78
74. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 22, ¶ 2, Dec.
19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
75. See CAROTHERS & BRECHENMACHER, supra note 24, at 41 (stating
measures that “limit independent civil society usually fail” to meet Article 22
requirements); ICNL & NED, supra note 24, at 52 (“Funding restrictions that
stifle the ability of [NGOs] to pursue their goals may well constitute unjustifiable interference with freedom of association.”); Kiai, supra note 24, at 6 (“[F ]undraising activities are protected under article 22 of the Covenant, and funding
restrictions that impede the ability of associations to pursue their statutory activities constitute an interference with article 22.”); Rutzen, supra note 37, at
33 (noting that restrictions on NGOs’ ability to fundraise likely violates Article
22).
76. G.A. Res. 53/144, annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/53/144, Declaration on the
Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, art. 13 (Mar. 8, 1999).
77. E.g., Human Rights Council Res. 32/31, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/32/L.29 (July
1, 2016); see also U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Practical Recommendations for the Creation and Maintenance of a Safe and Enabling Environment for Civil Society, Based on Good Practices and Lessons Learned, ¶¶ 72, 75,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/32/20 (Apr. 11, 2016) (stating “predictability of core funding”
is essential for NGOs to “work effectively and independently” and that “[w]here
no restrictions on the receipt of foreign funds apply to State institutions or businesses, the same should apply to civil society organizations”); Breen, supra note
27, at 52–54 (discussing various U.N. Resolutions dealing with the right to seek
resources); Kiai, supra note 24, at 6 (discussing the same); Rutzen, supra note
37, at 33–35 (discussing the same).
78. E.g., Council of Europe, Recommendation CM/Rec(2007)14 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the Legal Status of Non-Governmental
Organizations in Europe ¶ 50 (Oct. 10, 2007) (stating “NGOs should be free to
solicit and receive funding” limited only to the laws “applicable to customs, for-
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There is a gap, however, between the aspirations of international law and the actual practices of many countries for several
reasons. One reason is the limited legal reach of the relevant international law authorities—they simply are not binding on all
countries. Only 169 countries have ratified the Covenant, with
China being the most prominent country not included in that
number (although China signed the Covenant in 1998).79 Even
critics of these new restrictions acknowledge that the various
United Nations declarations are not legally binding, although
they arguably reflect an emerging soft-law consensus.80 And
while statements by regional bodies may reflect correct statements of laws within their region, their reach is limited to those
regions and the efficacy of the treaties upon which they are
based.81
Another reason for this gap between international law and
actual practices are barriers that limit the parties that may invoke the protections provided and when they may do so. Under
the original text of the Covenant, only states that are party to
the Covenant and have recognized the competence of the Human
Rights Committee that monitors compliance with the Covenant
may invoke the Committee’s authority to investigate and attempt to resolve alleged failures by another state to fulfill its ob-

eign exchange, money laundering and those on the funding of elections and political parties”); INTER-AM. COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, SECOND REPORT ON
THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS IN THE AMERICAS 73, 235 (2011)
(stating the right to receive cross-border funding to promote human rights is
protected by freedom of association and states should allow human rights organizations to seek cross border funding); see CAROTHERS & BRECHENMACHER,
supra note 24, at 42–43 box 4 (listing regional organizations that have weighed
in on the matter); Evered, supra note 10, at 171 (stating “the European Convention on the Recognition of the Legal Personality of International Non-Governmental Organizations . . . obligates ratifying states to recognize” and protect international NGOs); Gallus & Peterson, supra note 10, at 530–31 (discussing the
European and American Convention on Human Rights and noting these conventions may protect the right of association); ICNL & NED, supra note 24, at
54 (listing various regional bodies and their recognition of the right to freedom
of association); Rutzen, supra note 37, at 35 (listing examples of cross-border
funding protections provided by regional bodies).
79. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNITED NATIONS
TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%
20I/Chapter%20IV/IV-4.en.pdf (last visited Dec. 5, 2017).
80. CAROTHERS & BRECHENMACHER, supra note 24, at 41–42; Kiai, supra
note 24, at 6–7.
81. Gallus & Peterson, supra note 10, at 530–32.
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ligations under the Covenant—and then only if all domestic remedies have been invoked and exhausted.82 Under an optional protocol ratified by 115 countries, individuals may also submit complaints of alleged failures by those countries to the Committee,
but again they are subject to exhaustion of domestic remedies. 83
NGOs and others may also submit shadow or alternative reports
when a country that has ratified the Covenant submits its required reports to the Committee, but the Committee is not required to even consider such alternative reports (although it appears to usually do so), much less to act on them. 84 As for
regional human rights bodies, while natural persons in covered
states and sometimes even legal entities from those states, including NGOs, may invoke the dispute resolution procedures
available with respect to those bodies in Africa, the Americas,
and Europe, they generally may only do so after exhausting domestic remedies. 85 Some still existing Friendship, Commerce
and Navigation treaties entered into on a bilateral basis between
the United States and several countries also provide protection
for foreign involvement in NGOs, but only countries may assert
claims under such treaties. 86
A third reason is the lack of effective enforcement mechanisms, even if a state, natural person, or NGO successfully invokes the protections of binding international law with respect
to cross-border funding of NGOs. The Human Rights Committee
may seek resolution of an inter-state dispute under the Covenant and may communicate its views regarding a failure alleged
82. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 74,
art. 41, ¶ 1.
83. G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI), Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (Dec. 16, 1966);
Won-Mog Choi, The Present and Future of the Investor-State Dispute Settlement
Paradigm, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 725, 730–31 (2007).
84. See Human Rights Comm., The Relationship of the Human Rights Committee with Non-Governmental Organizations, U.N. DOC. CCPR/C/104/3 (June
4, 2012) (noting that shadow reports play an important role in “enhancing” the
Covenant).
85. Choi, supra note 83, at 730–31; Gallus & Peterson, supra note 10, at
531; Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, NGO Standing and Influence in Regional Human
Rights Courts and Commissions, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 911, 915–22 (2011).
86. International Investment Treaty Protection of Not-for-Profit Organizations 2–3 (Int’l Ctr. for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL), Working Paper, May 2008),
http://www.icnl.org/research/resources/dcs/BITNPOProtection2.pdf [hereinafter ICNL Treaty Protection]; see also John F. Coyle, The Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation in the Modern Era, 51 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 302,
343–44 (2013) (arguing that FCN treaties have become increasingly irrelevant
over time, only successfully invoked recently in a few, narrow areas).
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by an individual under the optional protocol, but the Committee
has no authority to penalize a state for not agreeing to a resolution or for not correcting a found failure beyond publicizing the
state’s action or inaction. 87 Instead, the Committee only has conciliatory powers and so does not have the authority to make a
judicial determination, but may only communicate its views on
a matter in dispute. 88 While the Covenant arguably obligates
states to create domestic means of addressing failures, the Committee faces the same limitations when seeking to enforce this
obligation. 89 The African, Americas, and European regional human rights bodies have more significant enforcement tools, but
even for those bodies the record of state compliance with ordered
remedies is mixed at best. 90
The existence of this gap and the reasons for it should not
obscure the country-specific options for challenging legal rules
that impose undue burdens on cross-border funding of NGOs.
These options include pushing back against overly burdensome
application of such rules, including in domestic courts;91 opposing the enactment of such legal rules by domestic lawmaking
bodies in the first place (or advocating their repeal if previously
87. Alan Brudner, The Domestic Enforcement of International Covenants of
Human Rights: A Theoretical Framework, 35 U. TORONTO L.J. 219, 219–20
(1995); see also Choi, supra note 83, at 740 (“[R]ecommendations issued by human rights bodies such as the Human Rights Committee lack binding effects
and enforcement power.”); Human Rights Treaty Bodies—Individual Communications, OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, http://ohchr
.org/EN/HRBodies/TBPetitions/Pages/IndividualCommunications.aspx#
whathappens (last visited Dec. 5, 2017) [hereinafter Treaty Bodies] (see the
“What happens once a Committee decides a case?” entry, which includes what
happens when the Human Rights Committee decides a case).
88. Brudner, supra note 87, at 220; Treaty Bodies, supra note 87.
89. See Anja Seibert-Fohr, Domestic Implementation of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Pursuant to Its Article 2 Para. 2, 5 MAX
PLANCK Y.B. OF U.N. L. 399, 435 (2001) (noting that states that have not created
domestic means to address failures have “attracted criticism” from the Committee).
90. Fekadeselassie F. Kidanemariam, Enforcement of Human Rights Under Regional Mechanisms: A Comparative Analysis, 53–54, 57–59, 62–63 (Jan.
1, 2006) (unpublished L.L.M. thesis, University of Georgia), http://
digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/stu_llm/80.
91. See, e.g., Shashank Bengali, Court Orders Indian Government To Release Greenpeace Funds, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/
world/asia/la-fg-india-greenpeace-funds-20150120-story.html (describing how
the Delhi High Court ordered the Indian government to release more than
$310,000 in funds provided by Greenpeace International for its India office after
finding that preventing that office from receiving foreign funding was unconstitutional).
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enacted);92 and urging other states, international organizations,
and other international actors to highlight these legal rules and
their inconsistency with international law. 93 Host country NGOs
can also use cross-border funding and other assistance for capacity building and developing domestic support, so that in the long
run they are no longer reliant on foreign support.94 But identifying and implementing the particular method or methods that are
most likely to be successful in a given country can be difficult
and time consuming, so it is desirable to consider whether any
more comprehensive and effective international legal protections exist or realistically could be created to combat the increasing legal restrictions on cross-border funding of NGOs. This consideration brings us to the promise of investment treaties.
II. THE PROMISE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES
Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and multilateral investment treaties (collectively “investment treaties”) provide
several significant advantages over the international agreements discussed previously and therefore have the potential to
close the gap between law and practice. First, and as detailed
further below, many countries that are not party to the Convention or regional human rights agreements are parties to investment treaties. 95 Second, in general, investment treaties explicitly provide that aggrieved private parties covered by a given
treaty may bring a claim against the states that are parties to
92. See, e.g., INT’L CTR. FOR NOT-FOR-PROFIT LAW, ANNUAL REPORT 2015–
16, at 4 [ hereinafter ICNL ANNUAL REPORT] (discussing a successful opposition
in Kyrgyzstan to a proposed foreign agent registration law for NGOs that receive foreign donations and engage in “political activity”).
93. See CAROTHERS, supra note 24, at 19–22 (discussing campaigns to block
closing-space legislation and noting the best campaigns “combine a coordinated
international effort” and are led by “a diverse domestic coalition of civil society
actors”); CAROTHERS & BRECHENMACHER, supra note 24, at 62 (noting one way
to push back is by “bolstering international normative and legal frameworks
that undergird civil society access to foreign resources and assistance”); ICNL
& NED, supra note 24, at 57–59 (discussing various ways of “protecting and
enhancing civil society space”); Moore & Rutzen, supra note 24, at 37–38 (stating that “[s]trategic outreach” to the international community can be “instrumental in influencing law and policy at the national level in various countries”
and listing examples of such outreach).
94. See, e.g., Kingsley Ighobor, Africa’s Civil Society Faces Up to Hostile
Governments, EURASIA REV. (Aug. 13, 2016), http://www.eurasiareview.com/
13082016-africas-civil-society-faces-up-to-hostile-governments (describing in
part efforts by civil society organizations in African countries with restrictive
rules to develop domestic financial and other support).
95. See infra note 107.

2018]

CROSS-BORDER NGO FUNDING

1227

the treaty, without the need to involve or obtain the consent of
their home state and usually without the need to first exhaust
domestic remedies (although preliminary procedures designed to
encourage settlement are often required), 96 and even when there
is an exhaustion requirement, it may be possible to avoid its application.97 Third, almost all such treaties provide for international arbitration to resolve any disputes, with the arbitration
decision generally enforceable in domestic courts in most countries.98 These provisions are particularly important because they
represent consent by the states that are parties to the treaties,
which is necessary to subject them both to such arbitration and
to national court enforcement of arbitration decisions. 99 This is
not to say that such treaties have been uniformly viewed as successful in resolving investment-related disputes, but they have
shifted the focus of such disputes away from host country courts
(with their risk of host country bias) to more neutral international arbitration bodies. 100 There are, however, several legal
hurdles that an NGO would have to clear in order to successfully
invoke the protection of an investment treaty, including whether
the states involved are party to such an agreement, jurisdic96. Anne van Aaken, Primary and Secondary Remedies in International Investment Law and National State Liability: A Functional and Comparative
View, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW 735
(Stephen W. Schill ed., 2010); Choi, supra note 83, at 732; David Gaukrodger &
Kathryn Gordon, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A Scoping Paper for the Investment Policy Community 10, 15 (Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. Working
Papers on Int’l Inv., No. 2012/03, 2012), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/finance
-and-investment/investor-state-dispute-settlement_5k46b1r85j6f-en.
97. See Stephen R. Halpin III, Note, Stayin’ Alive?: BG Group, PLC v. Republic of Argentina and the Vitality of Host-Country Litigation Requirements in
Investment Treaty Arbitration, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1979, 2012–16 (2014)
(discussing the effects of the United States Supreme Court upholding an international arbitration agreement procured after bypassing a host country’s legal
system).
98. Choi, supra note 83, at 741; Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 96, at
64.
99. ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUÍS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES: STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 44 (2009); Gary Born, A New
Generation of International Adjudication, 61 DUKE L.J. 775, 828–29, 836–37
(2012).
100. See, e.g., William W. Burke-White, The Argentine Financial Crisis:
State Liability Under BITs and the Legitimacy of the ICSID System, 3 ASIAN J.
WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 199 (2008) (discussing the flawed and inconsistent outcomes in certain investment-related disputes submitted to an international arbitration tribunal); Choi, supra note 83 (discussing the pros and cons
of investor-state dispute settlements and the lessons to be learned moving forward).
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tional limitations, and being able to state a covered cause of action that can be addressed through an available remedy. 101 In
addition, and as will be discussed below, the limitation of available remedies to monetary damages under most, if not all, investment treaties is a significant disadvantage when it comes to
challenging restrictions on cross-border funding of NGOs.
A. STATE PARTIES
In common with the international agreements that specifically protect freedom of association, investment treaties are only
binding on the states that are party to them. 102 The number of
such agreements continues to grow: in 2006, there were approximately 2500 BITs and three multilateral investment treaties
that were the equivalent of another 2000 BITs;103 in 2015, there
were over 2900 BITs, plus an additional 358 other types of international investment agreements, some of which contain BITequivalent provisions. The pace of growth for investment treaties and other types of international investment agreements,
however, has slowed since 2007. 104 While these figures can be
parsed further given differences among BITs, it is generally
agreed that even limiting the count to relatively strong BITs
(that is, ones that reflect the dominant current approach to such
treaties by including a comprehensive, effective advance commitment by the state parties to investor-initiated arbitration) reveals a similarly fast rate of growth. 105 In addition, countries
that are not parties to the Covenant or any regional human
rights agreements may be parties to numerous investment treaties.106 For example, China has not ratified the Covenant and is
101. See discussion infra Parts II.A, II.B, II.C.
102. See supra, notes 79–81 and accompanying text.
103. Gallus & Peterson, supra note 10, at 532.
104. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2016: Investor Nationality: Policy Challenges, 101,
UNCTAD/WIR/2016 [hereinafter UNCTAD 2016]. The existing multilateral
treaties that provide foreign direct investment protection include the ASEAN
Comprehensive Investment Agreement, the Energy Charter Treaty, and the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (Chapter 11). See NEWCOMBE
& PARADELL, supra note 99, at 53–54; Born, supra note 99, at 834; Jason Webb
Yackee, Conceptual Difficulties in the Empirical Study of Bilateral Investment
Treaties, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 405, 434 (2008); UNCTAD 2016, supra, at 105–
06.
105. Yackee, supra note 104, at 423–25, 427–29.
106. For the three major regional human rights treaties, fifty-three countries have ratified the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, twentyfive countries have ratified or acceded to the American Convention on Human
Rights (plus the United States has signed but not ratified that agreement), and
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not party to any regional human rights treaty, but it is party to
110 BITs and another nineteen treaties with investment provisions currently in force.107 Of the twenty-eight other countries
that are eligible to ratify the Covenant but have not done so,
seven are not party to a regional human rights treaty but have
a significant number of BITs and a number of other treaties with
investment provisions currently in force (Cuba, Malaysia, Oman,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and the United Arab Emirates). 108
It is also necessary for an NGO providing cross-border funding to be from a country with an applicable investment treaty
with the host country in order to invoke the protections provided
by that treaty. 109 To the extent that is not the case, however, it
often will be possible to create an entity in a different state that
does have such an agreement and use that entity to provide the
funding in order to overcome this hurdle. For-profit investors
have in fact used this strategy with significant success. 110 Some
forty-seven countries have ratified or acceded to the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. See American
Convention on Human Rights “Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica” (B-32): Signatories
and Ratifications, ORG. OF AM. STATES, http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_B-32_
American_Convention_on_Human_Rights_sign.htm (last visited Dec. 5, 2017);
Chart of Signatures and Ratifications of Treaty 005: Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, COUNCIL OF EUR., http://
www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/005/
signatures?p_auth=3oT2oPOE (last updated May 10, 2017); Ratification Table:
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, AFRICAN COMM’N ON HUMAN &
PEOPLES’ RIGHTS, http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr/ratification (last
visited Dec. 5, 2017).
107. See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development: Investment Policy
Hub, International Investment Agreements Navigator, http://
investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/IiasByCountry#iiaInnerMenu (last visited
Dec. 5, 2017); Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard, OFF. OF THE UNITED
NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, http://indicators.ohchr.org (last
visited Dec. 5, 2017); see also NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 99, at 56–57.
108. See supra notes 106–07.
109. See supra notes 79–81 and accompanying text.
110. See SUZY H. NIKIEMA, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., BEST PRACTICES DEFINITION OF INVESTOR 3 (2012), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2012/best_
practices_definition_of_investor.pdf; Andrea K. Bjorklund, The Emerging Civilization of Investment Arbitration, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1269, 1278–80 (2009);
Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 96, at 55–57 (discussing treaty shopping by
investors); Christoph Schreuer, Investments, International Protection ¶¶ 33–34,
MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT’L L., http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/
10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1533?rskey
=qbHuB9&result=1&prd=EPIL (last updated June 2013). See generally
UNCTAD 2016, supra note 104, at 171–81 (discussing the effect ownership
structures of multinational entities has on the coverage and reach of international investment agreements).
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investment treaties deny their protections for entities formed in
a particular country solely to gain access to that treaty, however,
and this may be a growing trend. 111 For example, such a “denial
of benefits” provision is included in the U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty. 112 In addition, while the recent European Union-Canada Comprehensive and Economic Trade Agreement
only has a relatively limited denial of benefits provision, it also
includes a general good faith provision that could bar some attempts to obtain treaty protection in this manner. 113 So the requirement that both the cross-border funder and the recipient of
the cross-border funding be located in countries who are party to
the same investment treaty could prove an obstacle to some potential claims against restrictions on such funding.
B. JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES
If a particular foreign-NGO/domestic-NGO relationship is
potentially covered by an investment treaty because the two
NGOs are in countries that are both parties to such an agreement, there are still several jurisdictional issues that the foreign
NGO would have to overcome. These issues include temporal jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and subject-matter jurisdiction.114
Temporal jurisdiction is relatively straightforward: was the
legal restriction imposed on the cross-border funding during the
111. See RUDOLPH DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 55 (Oxford Univ. Press 2008); Bjorklund, supra

note 110, at 1278 & n.44; UNCTAD 2016, supra note 104, at 174.
112. U.S. STATE DEP’T: BUREAU OF ECON. AFFAIRS, 2012 U.S. MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY art. 17 (2012), https://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/bit
[hereinafter 2012 U.S. MODEL BIT].
113. See Comprehensive and Economic Trade Agreement (CETA), Can.-European Union, arts. 8.16, 8.18(3), Sept. 14, 2016, 2017 O.J. (L11) 23, http://
data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10973-2016-INIT/en/pdf; see also
Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Austl., Case No. 2012-12, Award on Jurisdiction and
Admissibility, ¶¶ 539–54, 588 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2012), https://www.italaw.com/
sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7303_0.pdf (discussing when the restructuring of an investment in order to fall within the scope of protection of a
given treaty is an abuse of rights and so should fail, and concluding that such
an abuse of rights occurred in the case).
114. Gallus & Peterson, supra note 10, at 534–35; MacKenzie, supra note
10, at 222–33 (discussing the various jurisdictional requirements in arbitrations); ICNL Treaty Protection, supra note 86, at 7–10 (discussing how a treaty’s
definition of terms like investment may affect jurisdiction); see also Bjorklund,
supra note 110, at 1274 (discussing temporal requirements for jurisdiction). It
could be argued that the temporal aspect is better viewed as a procedural issue,
but the exact terminology is not critical here.
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time period when the investment treaty was in effect? 115 Even if
a country enacted the restriction prior to the applicable treaty’s
enactment, temporal jurisdiction generally will be satisfied if the
application of that restriction at issue occurred during the same
period when the treaty was in effect. 116 In addition, the aging of
existing investment agreements and the fact that most of the restrictions unduly burdening cross-border funding of NGOs are of
relatively recent vintage means that in many, probably most, situations temporal jurisdiction will exist. 117
Personal jurisdiction is trickier because the parties protected by investment agreements depend on the exact language
of the agreement at issue, which can vary significantly. In some
agreements, nonprofit or noncommercial entities are either explicitly covered or the definition of the covered entities is very
broad, and so likely includes NGOs. 118 For example, the current
U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty provides standing to
bring claims to any “enterprise” of a (state) party to the agreement, with enterprise defined so as to include entities constituted or organized under applicable law “whether or not for
profit.” 119
Such a broad definition appears to be the prevailing trend
in investment treaties. 120 Some treaties may clearly not include
nonprofit or noncommercial entities, however, or may fail to provide any guidance on this point, leaving personal jurisdiction
over NGOs uncertain. 121 For example, a draft of the recent India
Model Bilateral Investment Treaty only covered an “enterprise”
with “real and substantial business operations” in the host state,
which it further defined as having “made a substantial and long
term commitment of capital . . . ; engaged a substantial number
of employees . . . ; made a substantial contribution to the development of the Host State . . . ; and carried out all of its operations

115. See Bjorklund, supra note 110, at 1282; Gallus & Peterson, supra note
10, at 535.
116. See, e.g., Gami Invs. v. Mexico, 44 I.L.M. 545, 560–61 (2005); ICNL
Treaty Protection, supra note 86, at 20.
117. See Bjorklund, supra note 110, at 1282; Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra
note 96, at 65.
118. Gallus & Peterson, supra note 10, at 535–36.
119. 2012 U.S. MODEL BIT, supra note 112, at art. 1.
120. See Marie-France Houde, Novel Features in Recent OECD Bilateral Investment Treaties, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT PERSPECTIVES 143, 145
(2006).
121. Gallus & Peterson, supra note 10, at 535–36.
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in accordance with the Law of the Host State.” 122 This relatively
narrow definition, as compared to an earlier India Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, was an intentional decision by the Indian government to develop a more host-country-friendly
model. 123 The final version of the new Model Treaty slightly loosened this specific definition, but remained narrower than the old
version it replaced. 124
Many, if not most, investment treaties also give standing to
the state parties to bring claims, but to date it appears states
only very rarely choose to exercise this right. 125 And even if a
state chooses to bring a suit, it is usually limited to bringing suits
under the treaty relating to the interpretation of the treaty, as
opposed to a suit pursuing a claim for a particular investor.126 It
may, however, be able to bring a claim on behalf of a particular
investor as a matter of diplomatic protection more generally, as
long as the investor has not already filed a claim under the
treaty. 127 An interesting possible ramification of this limitation
is that a host country facing a claim from an NGO that receives
a significant amount of home-country government funding, or
has close ties to that government, might argue that the NGO is
effectively an arm of its home-country government and therefore
subject to any treaty-specific limitations on the ability of a state

122. Draft, Model Text for the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 1.2
(2015), https://www.mygov.in/sites/default/files/master_image/Model%20Text%
20for%20the%20Indian%20Bilateral%20Investment%20Treaty.pdf.
123. See Nikesh Patel, Note, An Emerging Trend in International Trade: A
Shift To Safeguard Against ISDS Abuses and Protect Host-State Sovereignty, 26
MINN. J. INT’L L. 273, 283–88 (2017) (discussing the difference between India’s
old and new model BITs, and the motivations driving those changes).
124. GOV’T OF INDIA: DEP’T OF ECON. AFFAIRS, MODEL TEXT FOR THE INDIAN
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY art. 1 (2015), http://finmin.nic.in/sites/default/
files/ModelTextIndia_BIT%20%281%29.pdf?download=1 [hereinafter 2015 INDIA MODEL BIT].
125. E.g., Ecuador v. United States, Case No. 2012-5, Award, (Perm. Ct. Arb.
2012), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7940
.pdf (analyzing standing arguments from both parties and determining there
was no standing due to the lack of a dispute as defined under the applicable
BIT); see Nick Gallus, Protection of Non-Governmental Organizations in Egypt
Under the Egypt-U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty, 14 INT’L J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT
L. 62, 69 (2012); UNCTAD 2016, supra note 104, at 172–75 (discussing the various factors that convey standing).
126. See KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: HISTORY, POLICY, AND INTERPRETATION 499 (2010).
127. See Enrico Milano, The Investment Arbitration Between Italy and Cuba:
The Application of Customary International Law Under Scrutiny, 11 LAW &
PRAC. INT’L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 499, 507–08 (2012).
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party to bring a claim.128 It should also be noted that at least the
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between
States and Nationals of Other States (the “ICSID Convention”)
precludes a parallel diplomatic convention case while a claim
brought by an investor against a host country is in arbitration;
so an NGO pursuing a claim under that convention could not
also have its home country pursue such a case at the same
time. 129
The most difficult jurisdictional issue for an NGO engaged
in cross-border funding likely would be subject matter jurisdiction, given that temporal and personal jurisdiction usually will
exist.130 This is because investment treaties generally only apply
to “investments,” although the definition of investment tends to
be broadly worded. 131 For example, the current U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty defines an investment as “every asset
that an investor owns or controls, directly or indirectly, that has
the characteristics of an investment, including such characteristics as the commitment of capital or other resources, the expectation of gain or profit, or the assumption of risk” and then provides a nonexclusive list of forms that an investment may take,
including equity interests, debt interests, various contracts, various other rights, and other property and related property
rights. 132 The use of the term “or” between “expectation of gain
or profit” and “assumption of risk” indicates that only one of the
commitment of capital or other resources or the expectation of
gain or profit or the assumption of risk is required for there to be
an investment for purposes of the treaty. Since cross-border
funding of a domestic NGO necessarily involves a commitment
of capital or other resources, and arguably also involves an assumption of risk (if only that the funds may not be used for their
designated purpose), such funding would appear to fall within
128. See Zymek, supra note 12, at 34–35.
129. See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between
States and Nationals of Other States art. 27, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575
U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention].
130. Although the definition of investment, which can be characterized as a
subject matter jurisdiction issue, is also relevant to who qualifies as an investor,
which can be characterized as a personal jurisdiction issue. See Gallus & Peterson, supra note 10, at 535–36.
131. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 99, at 65–66; Bjorklund, supra
note 110, at 1280.
132. 2012 U.S. MODEL BIT, supra note 112, at art. 1. This relatively broad
definition was also in the previous U.S. MODEL BIT. Mark Kantor, Little Has
Changed in the New US Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, 27 ICSID REV. 335,
345–46 (2012).
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the terms of the model treaty and so any investment treaties using the same definition.133 Along the same lines, some investment treaties define investment negatively, with only a very limited number of items excluded from the term (and with items
that might encompass cross-border funding of a domestic NGO
generally not in that exclusion list).134
Such a broad definition appears to the prevailing trend in
investment treaties.135 There are, however, at least two other,
somewhat common definitions.136 One of those other definitions
provides that a covered investment is limited to one with an enterprise basis, by requiring a party seeking treaty benefits to
have established an “enterprise” in the host state, with the definition of enterprise potentially excluding noncommercial entities.137 The other common definition limits covered investments
to an inclusive list of covered assets, which may not be broad
enough to reach cross-border funding of a domestic NGO. 138 Furthermore, some arbitrators have held that an investment generally must be commercially oriented or intended to generate a
profit to fall within the protections of an investment treaty, even
in the face of a broad definition for investment in the applicable
treaty. 139
There is also a second, related subject-matter jurisdictional
issue that is relevant to claims relating to cross-border funding
of NGOs. If the home country and host country are both parties
to the ICSID Convention and the applicable investment treaty
permits use of International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) facilities for the arbitration, then a
133. See Mostajo, supra note 72, at 42–46 (discussing the low jurisdictional
barrier set by such broad definitions of investment).
134. See, e.g., 2015 INDIA MODEL BIT, supra note 124, art. 1.4 (listing the
types of assets not included within the definition of investment); Houde, supra
note 120, at 149 (discussing article 1 of the 2002 Mexico/Korea BIT).
135. Houde, supra note 120, at 145.
136. See SOUTH AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY, SADC MODEL BIT
WITH COMMENTARY art. 2, http://www.iisd.org/itn/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/
sadc-model-bit-template-final.pdf [hereinafter 2012 SADC MODEL BIT] (“ The
definition of investment is very critical and still very controversial. Three options are included here in full . . . .”).
137. See, e.g., 2012 SADC MODEL BIT, supra note 136, art. 2.
138. See, e.g., Agreement Between Canada and the Government of the People’s Republic of China for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Can.-China, art. 1(1), Sept. 9, 2012, 2014 Can. T.S. No. 2014-26; 2012
SADC MODEL BIT, supra note 136, art. 2.
139. See Sedelmayer v. Russ. Fed’n, Award, 65 (1998), https://www.italaw
.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0757.pdf; Gallus & Peterson, supra
note 10, at 537–38.
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claimant who uses those facilities can invoke the enforcement
provisions of that convention with respect to any award they receive.140 But in the view of some ICSID tribunals, those provisions are only available if the transaction at issue is an investment in an objective sense that has commerciality as a necessary
feature,141 or in the sense that it contributes to the economic development of the host state. 142 This is not a universally expressed view, and there is an argument that the term investment is broad enough under the ICSID Convention to encompass
some or essentially all cross-border funding by NGOs. 143 A similar issue may arise if instead a claimant relies on the enforcement provisions of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the “New York
Convention”), 144 which has sometimes been interpreted as having a similar limitation. 145 While many, perhaps most, investment treaties specify that any awards are commercial, in an effort to overcome this second hurdle regardless of the applicable
convention, it is unclear if such specifications are sufficient in all
instances.
Of course, if these issues relating to the definition of investment were the only potential hurdle for claims relating to crossborder funding of NGOs, funders and recipient domestic NGOs
might be able to restructure their arrangements so as to make it
easier to overcome them. For example, they might be able to do
140. See ICSID Convention, supra note 129, arts. 25(1), 54; Katharina DielGligor, Note and Comment, Competing Regimes in International Investment Arbitration: Choice Between the ICSID and Alternative Arbitral Systems, 22 AM.
REV. INT’L ARBITRATION 677, 685–86 (2011).
141. See Bjorklund, supra note 110, at 1280–82 (discussing jurisdictional criteria requiring certain commercial aspects); Gallus & Peterson, supra note 10,
at 538–43 (discussing ICSID criteria for investments and tribunals’ interpretations of those criteria).
142. See Salini Construttori S.P.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No.
ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 52 (July 23, 2001), 42 I.L.M. 609 (2003).
But see Julian Davis Mortenson, The Meaning of “Investment”: ICSID’s Travaux
and the Domain of International Investment Law, 51 HARV. J. INT’L L. 257, 272–
74 (2010) (criticizing the outcome from Salini Construttori).
143. See Evered, supra note 10, at 174–78 (suggesting ways in which an
NGO can fall under ICSID convention protection); Mostajo, supra note 72, at
35–39 (discussing ways in which NGOs meet certain jurisdictional requirements). See generally Mortenson, supra note 142 (urging investment tribunals
to recognize ICSID jurisdiction over a broad range of claims).
144. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2577, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (entered into force June
7, 1959).
145. Evered, supra note 10, at 176–77; ICNL Treaty Protection, supra note
86, at 28.
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so by making the transaction a loan, or otherwise structuring it
in a way that matched a more traditional investment.
Finally, some investment treaties may exclude certain hostcountry actions from the reach of the treaty. For example, the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) includes an exception for most tax provisions. 146 The India Model Bilateral Investment Treaty provides that the treaty does not apply to local
government measures, tax laws, and certain other types of
laws,147 although it is not clear whether this provision will make
its way into many of the actual treaties entered into by India. 148
Such exclusions may both block investment treaty claims relating to restrictions on cross-border funding of NGOs and provide
a roadmap for creating restrictions that are not vulnerable to
such claims.
C. CAUSES OF ACTION AND REMEDIES
Assuming an NGO providing cross-border funding to a domestic NGO is able to navigate the state parties and jurisdictional issues and so successfully invoke the protection of an investment treaty, and it appears this may be possible in at least
some situations, it would of course still have to bring a cause of
action available under the relevant investment treaty and seek
an available remedy. Investment treaties typically provide
causes of action for (1) failure to provide fair and equitable treatment; (2) failure to provide full protection and security; (3) imposition of arbitrary or discriminatory measures; (4) treatment of
the foreign investor and its investment less favorably than a national of the host state or (assuming a most-favored-nation treatment clause) a third party; (5) impeding free transfers; and (6)
uncompensated expropriation. 149 They also generally require national treatment—that is, in this context, no worse treatment for
the foreign funder and the recipient domestic NGO than if the
funder was a domestic one 150—although that cause of action
would not be available if the host country imposes its restrictions
146. North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., art. 2103, Dec.
17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993).
147. 2015 INDIA MODEL BIT, supra note 124, art. 2.4.
148. See Priti Patnaik, Deconstructing India’s Model Bilateral Investment
Treaty, WIRE (Sept. 16, 2016), https://thewire.in/66558/deconstructing-indias
-model-bilateral-investment-treaty.
149. See Susan D. Franck, Integrating Investment Treaty Conflict and Dispute Systems Design, 92 MINN. L. REV. 161, 172 (2007); Schreuer, supra note
110, ¶¶ 48, 84.
150. Schreuer, supra note 110, ¶ 67.
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equally on all funders and recipient NGOs (such as has recently
occurred in Egypt).151
These causes of action almost certainly apply to the types of
restrictions on cross-border funding that have arisen in recent
years. For example, almost all of the restrictions triggered by the
receipt of cross-border funding—whether additional registration
and reporting obligations, advance government approval, additional taxes or unfavorable exchange rates, required channeling
through government channels, budget limitations, and barring
funding for certain activities—violate the less favorably requirement, and may also violate both the fair and equitable treatment
requirement and the arbitrary or discriminatory measures prohibition, depending on their exact provisions and effect. 152 The
common legal restrictions placed on the foreign NGOs that provide such funding—including repeated and burdensome investigation, refusal to process registration applications, criminal
prosecution, and expulsion—raise similar issues. 153 For a foreign
NGO with a legitimate concern about the treatment of cross-border funding, establishing a cause of action should therefore be
relatively straightforward, unless there is a treaty-specific exception that might apply. 154
With respect to remedies, it should be noted that when an
arbitration tribunal finds a state has violated an investment
treaty, it is unclear whether it can order a remedy other than
monetary damages, especially as arbitration tribunals have
tended to limit final remedies to monetary damages.155 The
availability of other remedies, such as declaring a host country
domestic law or administrative decision illegal or issuing an injunction, may depend on the language of the investment treaty
at issue. 156 For example, the U.S. Model Bilateral Investment
Treaty only permits the award of monetary damages (including
any applicable interest) or restitution of property, with the host
151. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
154. See Mostajo, supra note 72, at 47–74 (discussing the substantive protections provided under most BITs and providing examples of how NGOs can
take advantage of those protections); ICNL Treaty Protection, supra note 86, at
10–11, 20–25 (discussing substantive protections provided by BITs and actions
of states that may violate those protections).
155. See e.g., van Aaken, supra note 96, at 734; Gallus, supra note 125, at
90; Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 96, at 25; ICNL Treaty Protection, supra
note 86 at 25–27 .
156. See Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 96, at 25.
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country having the option to substitute monetary damages for
such property.157 That model treaty’s only mention of injunctive
relief is to permit a claimant to seek interim injunctive relief in
a host country forum for “the sole purpose of preserving the
claimant’s or the enterprise’s rights and interests during the
pendency of the arbitration.” 158 Similarly, the India Model Bilateral Investment Treaty bars tribunals from awarding injunctive
relief, and also from awarding punitive or moral damages. 159
Such explicit limitations on available remedies may reflect a
trend toward more host-country-protective investment treaties,
even on the part of developed countries such as the United
States. Finally, as a practical matter it is difficult to imagine
that a court enforcing an arbitration award would be likely to
order specific performance in another country.
Consistent with what appears to be the dominant language
in investment treaties, tribunals appear to have almost always
provided injunctive relief only as a provisional remedy while a
dispute resolution is ongoing, as opposed to including injunctive
relief in the final remedy resolving a dispute. 160 (Although this
may in part reflect the fact that investors have historically usually only sought monetary damages. 161) While an NGO attempting to provide cross-border funding to a domestic NGO may in
fact suffer damages that can be readily monetized—for example,
if a tax is imposed on such funding or such funding is seized by
the state—often the NGO will be more interested in obtaining
relief that would permit it to proceed with the funding free from
the imposition of unduly burdensome restrictions. It is far from
clear that arbitration tribunals would be able or, even if able,
particularly open to providing such relief, or that host countries
would be willing to comply with tribunal decisions ordering such
relief as opposed to monetary damages, especially since such relief may be less easily enforceable against host countries in national courts.162 Finally, even if a tribunal would be willing to
declare that a particular law should not apply to a given NGO—
and the host country agreed to follow that declaration—the case157. 2012 U.S. MODEL BIT, supra note 112, art. 34(1).
158. Id. art. 26(3).
159. 2015 INDIA MODEL BIT, supra note 124, arts. 26.3–.4.
160. See Farshad Rahimi Dizgovin, Foundations of Specific Performance in
Investor-State Dispute Settlements: Is It Possible and Desirable?, 28 FLA. J. INT’L
L. 1, 12–21 (2016) (discussing the use of specific performance in enforcing investment treaties); Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 96, at 28–29.
161. Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 96, at 11.
162. See id at 98–100.
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by-case nature of investment treaty arbitrations argues against
any other NGO being able to rely on that decision, as opposed to
having to bring its own challenge if the host country tried to apply to relevant law to it. 163 While a latter claimant might be able
to nevertheless make an estoppel argument against the host
country, factual differences between cases may make it difficult
to win such an argument. In other words, the best result an NGO
likely could obtain, even if the treaty language permitted injunctive relief and an arbitration tribunal was willing to provide such
relief, would be to win what would effectively be an as-applied
challenge to a host country law, not a facial challenge.
*****

The above discussion reveals that international commercial
law in the form of bilateral and multilateral investment treaties
may provide a legally viable avenue in some situations for challenging undue burdens on cross-border funding of NGOs, but
there are several significant legal hurdles an NGO bringing such
a claim would have to overcome. At a minimum, those hurdles—
particularly state parties and subject matter jurisdiction concerns—may foreclose a substantial proportion of potential claims
relating to cross-border funding of NGOs. To determine how
large that proportion likely is would require not only an empirical analysis of the agreements 164 but also a mapping of that analysis against the countries imposing overly burdensome restrictions on the recipients or providers of such funding, a major
task that is beyond the scope of this Article. The limitation on
remedies may also make a significant number of otherwise viable claims unattractive to the NGOs involved if provable monetary damages are limited. Yet if these obstacles were the only
ones preventing the bringing of such claims, it would be surprising that not a single such claim has been brought, given that
these obstacles almost certainly do not block all such claims. 165
163. See infra note 187 and accompanying text.
164. For an approach to such analysis that could possibly be used in this
context, see Wolfgang Alschner & Dmitriy Skougarevskiy, Mapping the Universe of Investment Agreements, 19 J. INT’L ECON. L. 561 (2016).
165. The closest situation appears to have been when an NGO pursued a
commercial investor claim for which it had received the rights. See Victor Pey
Casado and Foundation “President Allende” v. The Republic of Chile, ICSID
Case No. ARB/98/2, Award (Sept. 13, 2016), https://www.italaw.com/sites/
default/files/case-documents/italaw7630.pdf; ICNL Treaty Protection, supra
note 86, at 30 (possibly discussing this case); Zymek, supra note 12, at 14 (discussing this case).
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This is particularly true given almost 700 investment treaty
claims were brought by commercial investors through 2015. 166
While it is possible that most NGOs involved in cross-border
funding are simply not aware of this option, the experience of
commercial investors suggests another reason why such NGOs
would be unlikely to pursue such a claim even if it were legally
viable: cost.
III. THE COSTS OF INVOKING INVESTMENT TREATIES
It has been known for many years that invoking the protections of investment treaties can be expensive. 167 Because of the
relatively small number of claims and the limited public information regarding these costs, it is only recently that the true
magnitude of those financial costs has started to become apparent, however. In addition, a claim relating to cross-border funding of NGOs might also result in reputational costs to the NGO
bringing the claim (both with respect to the challenged host
country and with respect to other countries where the NGO may
work or may want to work in the future) and principle costs (to
the extent that invoking the protections of an investment treaty
may undermine the principles or ideals of the NGO).
A. FINANCIAL COSTS
The costs of invoking either (1) the ICSID facilities and
rules; or (2) conciliation and arbitration facilities that use the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) rules—the two paths that are usually available and
chosen by claimants invoking the protections of investment treaties—have become clearer over time. 168 First, a nonrefundable
fee of $25,000 is required to begin conciliation or arbitration proceedings under the ICSID rules.169 Organizations that apply the
166. UNCTAD 2016, supra note 104, at 104.
167. Lee M. Caplan, Making Investor-State Arbitration More Accessible to
Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises, in THE FUTURE OF INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 297, 304–07 (Catherine A. Rogers & Roger P. Alford eds., 2009); Gallus, supra note 125, at 91; Gallus & Peterson, supra note 10, at 547–48; ICNL
Treaty Protection, supra note 86, at 27; MacKenzie, supra note 10, at 219, 234.
168. See NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 99, at 59; Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 96, at 64, 68 (summarizing dispute resolution systems);
UNCTAD 2016, supra note 104, at 103–04 (discussing transparency rules for
investor-state arbitrations).
169. Schedule of Fees, INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES (ICSID) (2017) https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/icsiddocs/Schedule-of-Fees
.aspx.
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UNCITRAL rules appear to have similar or even higher initial
fees. 170 But this is only the tip of the iceberg. Conciliators, arbitrators, commissioners, and ad hoc committee members who
oversee and decide the dispute have a right not only to reimbursement of direct expenses reasonably incurred but also to a
fee of $3000 per day of meetings or other work performed under
the ICSID rules. 171 The UNCITRAL rules do not provide a set
figure for such fees to be paid by the parties, but only require
that they be reasonable and clearly stated in the final award. 172
This obligation on the parties to pay these costs is in contrast to
most state-state international dispute mechanisms and human
rights decisionmaking bodies, under which a state-funded institution usually compensates the decision makers. 173 In addition,
in most disputes these costs pale in comparison to the legal counsel and expert costs.
More specifically, a recent Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) study by David Gaukrodger
and Kathryn Gordon, based on the limited publicly available
data (many international arbitration decisions do not include
cost information), found that on average the cost of arbitration
between investors and states (whether under the ICSID rules,
the UNCITRAL rules, or another system) is eight million dollars
per dispute, with costs in some disputes exceeding thirty million
dollars and with on average eighty-two percent of these costs being for legal counsel and experts (as opposed to for the arbitrators or the institutional body involved). 174 While the prevailing
party may be able to shift some or all of its costs to the losing
party, in many cases this shift does not occur, and whether it will
occur in a given dispute is highly uncertain, although the trend
may be toward a presumptive loser-pays model. 175 And of course
170. See, e.g., Schedule of Fees and Costs, PERMANENT COURT ARBITRATION,
https://www.pca-cpa.org/fees-and-costs (last visited Dec. 5, 2017) (listing fees
and costs for the services of the Permanent Court of Arbitration); SIAC Schedule of Fees, SING. INT’L ARBITRATION CTR., http://siac.org.sg/estimate-your-fees/
siac-schedule-of-fees (last visited Dec. 5, 2017) (listing fees and costs for the services of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre).
171. ICSID, supra note 169.
172. U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law (UNCITRAL), UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules arts. 40–41 (2011).
173. Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 96, at 11.
174. Id. at 19.
175. Susan D. Franck, Rationalizing Costs in Investment Treaty Arbitration,
88 WASH. U. L. REV. 769, 843–44 (2011); Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 96,
at 22; David Smith, Note, Shifting Sands: Cost-and-Fee Allocation in International Investment Arbitration, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 749, 750 (2011).
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the claimant could be the losing party and so face the prospect of
not only having to bear its own costs but also some or all of the
defending host country’s costs.176
Not surprisingly given these high costs, the publicly available information on the damages sought by investors indicates
those damages range from a low of eight million dollars to a high
of $2.5 billion. 177 Claims worth less than at least several million
dollars are likely not economically feasible.178 This is particularly true given that amounts awarded as damages are usually
significantly less than the damages claimed. 179 Furthermore, the
existence of numerous claims by for-profit investors in the
amounts of many millions of dollars is possible given there is
now over $1.5 trillion in foreign direct investment annually. 180
Yet, from 1987 through 2015, only slightly fewer than 700 such
claims (under any set of international arbitration rules) are
known to have been brought, with the bulk of such claims
brought in the past fifteen or so years. 181 The existence of an international arbitration option almost certainly makes it easier
for international investors to successfully resolve claims through
host country domestic channels, which may often be less expensive, as well as less likely to antagonize the host country, although there does not appear to be any data on this effect and so
it is impossible to determine its magnitude.
As previously noted, the level of cross-border funding of
NGOs is difficult to determine but appears to be a much more
modest amount of tens of billions of dollars annually. 182 The largest NGO involved in cross-border funding is probably the Bill
and Melinda Gates Foundation (the “Gates Foundation”). In
2015, the Gates Foundation made approximately four billion dollars in grants, spread across dozens of countries and over a thousand recipients (including many in the United States, where the

176. Franck, supra note 175, at 785–86.
177. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2015: Reforming International Investment Governance, 115,
UNCTAD/WIR/2015 [hereinafter UNCTAD 2015].
178. Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 96, at 23.
179. UNCTAD 2015, supra note 177, at 146; Susan D. Franck, Empirically
Evaluating Claims About Investment Treaty Arbitration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1, 57–
62 (2007).
180. UNCTAD 2016, supra note 104, at 2; OECD, FDI IN FIGURES 1 (2017),
http://oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/FDI-in-Figures-April-2017.pdf.
181. UNCTAD 2016, supra note 104, at 104.
182. See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text.
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Gates Foundation is based).183 Slightly fewer than eighty of
these grants were for ten million dollars or more, with most of
the recipients of those grants going either to NGOs based in the
United States, international organizations (such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World
Health Organization), or foreign government agencies (such as
the United Arab Emirates Minster of State Office). 184 Therefore
the potential claims by even the Gates Foundation that could
justify the cost of pursuing an international arbitration proceeding are relatively few, assuming the various legal hurdles identified above to invoking the protection of an applicable investment treaty could be overcome. That said, even as large a funder
as the Gates Foundation is not immune from the impact of restrictions on cross-border funding, as the Indian government recently revoked the license of a Gates Foundation grantee to accept such funding. 185
Those jurisdictional and other legal hurdles also add to the
likely cost of bringing a claim pursuant to an investment treaty,
especially since host countries presumably will generally raise
any viable jurisdictional concerns. Among for-profit investors
through 2015, about a third of the approximately 440 concluded
cases were decided in favor of the host country, about a quarter
in favor of the investor, with the remainder either settled (usually with the terms kept confidential) or discontinued. 186 In light
of the jurisdictional uncertainties mentioned above, a lower success rate for providers of cross-border funding to NGOs is likely.
This is especially true given that even if an NGO providing crossborder funding successfully overcomes those jurisdictional concerns in a particular dispute, arbitration tribunal decisions are
not precedential for any subsequent tribunal, even those applying the same investment treaty (although they often are cited by

183. Grantmaking: Awarded Grants (2015), BILL & MELINDA GATES
FOUND., http://www.gatesfoundation.org/How-We-Work/Quick-Links/Grants
-Database#q/year=2015&sort=amount (last visited Dec. 5, 2017) [hereinafter
Gates Foundation, Grantmaking]; BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUND., INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE FORM 990-PF: RETURN OF PRIVATE FOUNDATION (2015), at
11, https://www.gatesfoundation.org/~/media/GFO/Who-We-Are/Financials/F_
535940_15_GatesFoundation_FS.PDF?la=en.
184. Gates Foundation, Grantmaking, supra note 183.
185. See Nida Najar, India’s Ban on Foreign Money for Health Group Hits
Gates Foundation, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/04/20/world/asia/india-health-nonprofit-gates-foundation.html?mcubz=3.
186. UNCTAD 2016, supra note 104, at 107.
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later tribunals as persuasive authority). 187 This lack of formal
precedential status also lessens the attractiveness of a test case
approach by which a group of well-resourced cross-border funders pays for the costs of a particular case with favorable facts
in order to hopefully establish positive legal authority for later
cases, particularly on jurisdictional issues. So even if an NGO
providing cross-border funding has a large enough potential
claim to justify the cost of pursuing arbitration under an investment treaty, and the resources to cover that cost, there is a substantial chance it would not be successful (and the NGO might
even be required to cover the costs of the challenged host country). Given the lack of previous claims by NGOs and the novel
legal issues discussed previously that such claims likely would
raise, the magnitude of legal counsel and expert costs for such
claims is highly uncertain and so it cannot be assumed that those
costs would necessarily be significantly less as compared to the
legal counsel and expert costs related to pursuing for-profit investor claims.
The costs already discussed also do not include the costs associated with enforcing an arbitration tribunal’s monetary damages award. States that are required to pay monetary damages
under international arbitration decisions sometimes refuse to do
so. 188 Seeking enforcement of such damages in national courts
may also sometimes be particularly difficult for NGOs, in that
the New York Convention and other applicable domestic laws
may impose additional jurisdictional hurdles that could frustrate such attempts, especially if the host country involved is one
of the approximately twenty-five (including China and the
United States) that have chosen to limit the reach of the New
York Convention to disputes arising out of commercial relationships. 189 And of course having to enforce a damage award only

187. MARIEL DIMSEY, THE RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
DISPUTES: CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS 40–41 (2008); NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 99, at 59–60; Bjorklund, supra note 110, at 1294; W. Mark
C. Weidemaier, Toward a Theory of Precedent in Arbitration, 51 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1895, 1908 (2010).
188. Gallus, supra note 125, at 92; MacKenzie, supra note 10, at 219; Mostajo, supra note 72, at 80–82; ICNL Treaty Protection, supra note 86, at 28; see
also Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 96, at 30–31.
189. Evered, supra note 10, at 176–77; Gallus & Peterson, supra note 10, at
530; ICNL Treaty Protection, supra note 86 at 28. In contrast, for arbitration
awards enforceable under the ICSID Convention, domestic courts are generally
required to treat the award as a final decision of a domestic court, and so are
barred from refusing to enforce the award on public policy or other grounds not
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further lengthens the time period for the dispute, 190 which may
have already spanned several years, 191 and so further delays any
recoupment of the costs incurred. Finally, other barriers to enforcement may exist, such as the application of sovereign immunity to protect certain state-owned assets from seizure to satisfy an arbitration award. 192
In sum, the considerable financial costs involved with pursuing international arbitration as currently provided for in investment treaties likely renders all but a few potential claims by
NGOs providing cross-border funding uneconomical, especially
once the uncertainty of prevailing and the possibility of having
to pay the defendant state’s costs are taken into account. And
these are not the only costs that an NGO claimant may face.
B. REPUTATIONAL COSTS
Bringing a claim against a given host country might poison
a given cross-border funder’s relationship with that country,
rendering it difficult or even impossible to continue to work in
that country even if the claim results in monetary damages for
the funder. 193 Such a result would undermine the funder’s goals
of helping the domestic NGOs and people of the host country and
so might not be acceptable to that funder. In addition, if a crossborder funder is known to have brought such a claim against one
country, other host countries might be less inclined to work with
the funder. Particularly for NGOs that engage in activities
where a good working relationship with host-country governments is seen as important or necessary, such reluctance could

based on the ICSID Convention’s terms. See ICSID Convention, supra note 129,
arts. 53, 54; Diel-Gligor, supra note 140, at 683–86.
190. Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 96, at 11.
191. Id. at 21; ICNL Treaty Protection, supra note 86 at 27.
192. See Andrea K. Bjorklund, State Immunity and the Enforcement of Investor-State Arbitral Awards, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE
21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTOPH SCHREUER 302, 303 (Christina Binder et al. eds., 2009); Andrea K. Bjorklund, Sovereign Immunity as a
Barrier to the Enforcement of Investor-State Arbitral Awards: The Re-Politicization of International Investment Disputes, 21 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 211, 211
(2010). The likely relatively smaller amounts for damage awards from crossborder funding of NGO claims, even if successful, may make this application of
sovereign immunity less of a concern, however. See Jacob A. Kuipers, Note, Too
Big To Nail: How Investor-State Arbitration Lacks an Appropriate Execution
Mechanism for the Largest Awards, 39 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 417, 417
(2016).
193. Gallus & Peterson, supra note 10, at 547.
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be a significant additional cost. 194 Bringing such a claim might
also have negative effects on the previously supported host country domestic NGOs, including loss of domestic support and persecution of staff.
The extent of such reputational costs is speculative at this
point, however. There do not appear to be any studies considering whether and to what extent for-profit investors pursuing
claims under investment treaties have suffered reputational
damage that prevented them from pursuing future investment
opportunities, either in the defendant host country or in host
countries generally. The studies of reputational effects of such
claims tend to focus instead on the reputation of the host-country
governments with respect to meeting their treaty obligations. 195
And of course such information may not be indicative of the potential reputational damage to NGOs, given the different nature
of their investments in the host countries. It is therefore highly
uncertain what effect, if any, bringing such claims might have
on the ability of an NGO to operate in the defendant host country
in the future, or in other countries. Of course, that very uncertainty is another reason why providers of cross-border funding
to NGOs may be reluctant to try to invoke the protections of international investment treaties to counter restrictions on such
funding.
C. PRINCIPLES COSTS
Some NGOs that engage in significant amounts of cross-border activity are also critical of current international commercial
law and particularly the growing web of investment treaties. 196
For example, the Transnational Institute is highly critical of investment treaties, viewing them as favoring the financial interests of large corporations over host country sovereignty and resulting in negative social and ecological impacts. 197 While less
194. Evered, supra note 10, at 160–62 (discussing the importance of reaching
agreement between the NGOs and host countries).
195. See, e.g., Shahryar Minhas & Karen Remmer, Contingent Institutions:
The Reputational Impact of Investor-State Disputes (Mar. 5, 2015), http://papers
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2576568 (exploring the extent to which
alleged violations of international commitments damage state reputations).
196. Gallus & Peterson, supra note 10, at 547; Mostajo, supra note 72, at 77–
78.
197. NICK BUXTON ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL INSTITUTE (TNI) & CORPORATE
EUROPE OBSERVATORY (CEO), LEGALISED PROFITEERING? HOW CORPORATE
LAWYERS ARE FUELLING AN INVESTMENT ARBITRATION BOOM (2011), https://
www.tni.org/en/briefing/legalised-profiteering.

2018]

CROSS-BORDER NGO FUNDING

1247

overtly critical, the Ford Foundation has also supported efforts
to reform international commercial law through its Reforming
Global Financial Governance initiative.198 NGOs with this perspective may be reluctant to invoke the protections provided by
the very system they criticize, as doing so might undermine their
other efforts and alienate some of their staff and supporters. It
is not clear, however, how many NGOs engaged in cross-border
funding have such concerns.
*****
Based on the experience of for-profit investors that have
brought claims under investment treaties, it is likely that the
financial costs faced by an NGO seeking to challenge a host country’s treatment of its cross-border funding activities or recipients
would render all or almost all such claims economically unwise.
This conclusion is reinforced by the significant, although not necessarily insurmountable, jurisdictional hurdles such an NGO
would need to clear, which could both doom the NGO’s claim and
possibly expose it to liability for the costs incurred by the defendant host-country government. The likely lack of both injunctive
relief and definite lack of precedential value for any arbitration
decision further reduce the attractiveness to an NGO of bringing
such a claim. While the potential reputational costs of pursuing
such a claim are much less certain, they also weigh against
bringing such a claim, as do the principles costs for those NGOs
that are critical of the international investment treaty structure.
Two commentators have argued that even the threat of an
investment treaty claim may be sufficient to alter host country
behavior and so blunt some of growing legal restrictions on crossborder funding without the need to incur the costs of actually
bringing such a claim.199 It may be that the availability of investment treaty claim mechanisms for for-profit investors has influenced investor-state relations generally and encouraged resolution of many disputes before the filing of a formal claim for
arbitration, even though a relatively small proportion of foreign
direct investments have been the subject of actual claims. 200 But
198. Institutional and Regulatory Reforms in the European Union. Re-Mapping Economic and Financial Governance After the Crisis, ECONOMIA CIVILE,
http://www.aitomo.it/ford (last visited Dec. 5, 2017) (discussing a project funded
by the Ford Foundation to contribute to regulating the financial sector).
199. ICNL Treaty Protection, supra note 86, at 29–30.
200. W. Michael Reisman, International Investment Arbitration and ADR;
Married but Best Living Apart, in U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV.
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it likely was necessary for some successful claims to be made before most host countries took their investment treaty obligations
seriously. Absent any claims by NGOs relating to cross-border
funding—much less successful claims—host countries could, and
likely would, accurately judge that a threat to bring such a claim
is a hollow one. Furthermore, even if it could be demonstrated
that such claims can be viable, the relatively small amounts of
damages available would also limit the effect of potential exposure to such claims on host country behavior. Finally, and as will
be discussed further in the next Part, at least at this time, it appears that host countries perceive a much lower national need
for such funding (as opposed to foreign direct investment) and so
are likely to be less concerned about developing a reputation for
being hostile to such funding or otherwise discouraging such
funding.
Does this mean NGOs facing the growing legal restrictions
on cross-border funding have no viable international law remedy
to challenge such restrictions? The answer is currently yes, but
there may be ways to modify the existing international-investment protection legal regime to better accommodate claims by
such NGOs. It may also be possible to develop a separate international treaty framework to better protect such funding, consistent with the international law. The next Part addresses these
possibilities.
IV. REVISITING THE PROMISE OF INTERNATIONAL
TREATIES
There are at least two ways the existing legal regime could
be modified to increase the ability of NGOs providing cross-border funding to successfully access a formal international law regime to challenge unduly burdensome legal restrictions on such
funding. One way would be either to fund, or to significantly reduce the financial costs associated with, invoking the protections
of existing investment treaties. This way is relatively feasible, in
that it would not require the creation of new treaties and could
be incorporated into already existing efforts to address the costs
of international arbitration generally. The other way would be to
try to create a distinct protection regime for such funding by
identifying the reasons for the relatively recent surge in investment treaties and trying to generate similar momentum for new
(UNCTAD), INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES: PREVENTION AND ALTERNATIVES TO
ARBITRATION II 22, 22–23 (2011); Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 96, at 13.
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agreements addressing cross-border funding of NGOs. This second way would be much more difficult to pursue and would almost certainly require a much longer time frame to implement,
but potentially could provide more certain and comprehensive
protection for such funding.
A. REDUCING THE FINANCIAL COSTS OF INVOKING INVESTMENT
TREATIES
Since the magnitude of reputational costs is uncertain and
may be minimal in some, if not many, instances, and since principles costs only probably apply to a relatively small portion of
the NGOs providing cross-border funding, it makes sense to focus primarily on reducing the financial costs that most clearly
pose a barrier to NGOs seeking to invoke the protections of investment treaties. There are a number of existing proposals for
addressing the costs of arbitration under investment treaties
generally that could help achieve this goal, including making
resolution of disputes more cost effective, facilitating third-party
financing of claims, and increasing the amount and certainty of
cost-shifting to the losing party, 201 although the openness of host
countries to these changes is uncertain (at least to the extent
they may make it easier to bring claims against them). There
also are several possible ways to reduce these costs specifically
for NGOs seeking to challenge restrictions on their cross-border
funding activities, including permitting or requiring fee waivers
and encouraging pro bono legal and expert assistance.
1. Addressing the Costs of International Arbitration Generally
Turning first to the more general proposals, ICSID has already taken a number of steps to streamline its procedures and
so hopefully lower the financial costs of the parties invoking
those procedures, although it is not yet clear whether those steps
have actually reduced those costs. 202 Of course, cost reduction in
the form of a more efficient process risks reducing the quality of
the dispute resolution, although it is also not clear whether this
has occurred. 203 In addition, various commentators have suggested further ways to prevent disputes or manage them more
effectively, which could not only reduce financial costs but also
201. Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 96, at 21, 23, 37 (discussing each of
these proposals in turn).
202. Id. at 21.
203. Id. at 24 (discussing the United States’ and Canada’s formation of specialized legal departments to litigate investment disputes).
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might reduce reputational costs by putting less strain on investor-state relations. 204 These further ways tend to involve either
(1) host countries setting up institutions or procedures to better
identify and resolve potential disputes before they rise to the
level of formal claim and to better educate relevant government
officials; or (2) host countries and aggrieved investors pursuing
nonbinding alternate dispute resolution processes to more
quickly and cheaply resolve disputes that do arise. 205 But, as Michael Reisman has suggested with respect to why a significant
number of disputes are probably already resolved before a notice
of arbitration is submitted, these options likely will only be effective if backstopped by the credible threat of compulsory arbitration. 206 It is therefore necessary to not simply reduce the cost
of resolving disputes more generally as most of these suggestions
seek to do, but to also significantly reduce the cost of actual arbitration for NGOs so as make the threat of such arbitration
credible for NGOs engaged in cross-border funding.
A potentially more promising way of helping NGOs cover the
costs of arbitration would be for them to tap into the growing
availability of third-party financing for commercial litigation, including in the international investment context. 207 Interestingly,
in at least two cases NGOs have served as third-party funders
for international investment claims that were of interest to those
NGOs. 208 One case involved a 2010 claim by Philip Morris
against Uruguay, where the U.S.-based Campaign for TobaccoFree Kids provided funding for Uruguay’s successful defense. 209
204. See generally, U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV. (UNCTAD), INVESDISPUTES: PREVENTION AND ALTERNATIVES TO ARBITRATION II
(2011) (compiling and synthesizing ideas concerning alternative dispute resolutions in the international investment law context).
205. Id. at 1–2 (discussing various proposals related to alternative dispute
resolution).
206. Reisman, supra note 200, at 23.
207. Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 96, at 37; Mostajo, supra note 72, at
88–89; see, e.g., FULBROOK CAPITAL MGMT., LLC, http://www
.fulbrookmanagement.com (last visited Dec. 5, 2017) (displaying the website of
a company involved in dispute finance); Third-Party Funding, INT’L COUNCIL
FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION,
http://www.arbitration-icca.org/projects/
Third_Party_Funding.html (Dec. 5, 2017) (displaying the website of a group
studying third-party financing in international arbitration).
208. Luke Eric Peterson, Uruguay Hires Law Firm and Secures Outside
Funding To Defend Against Philip Morris Claim; Not the First Time an NGO
Offers Financial Support for Arbitration Costs, INV. ARB. REP., Oct. 20, 2010.
209. See Philip Morris Brands Sàrl et al. v. Oriental Republic of Uru., ICSID
Case No. ARB/10/7, Award, ¶¶ 1–2, 7, 15, 590 (July 8, 2016), https://www
.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7417.pdf; Peterson, supra

TOR-STATE

2018]

CROSS-BORDER NGO FUNDING

1251

The other case involved a successful 2003 set of claims pursued
by a group of dispossessed Zimbabwean farmers, which was partially funded by the U.K.-based AgricAfrica. 210 While this role
indicates that pursuing a claim in international arbitration is
not beyond the financial reach of all NGOs, it is notable that
these NGOs enjoyed financial support from Bloomberg Philanthropies and the Open Society Initiative of South Africa, respectively, which in turn are supported by the deep pockets of billionaires Michael Bloomberg and George Soros. 211
Third-party financing in this context raises a variety of concerns, including possible conflicts between the provider of financing and the NGO regarding the appropriate resolution of the dispute, whether such financing should be disclosed to the
arbitrators, and whether such financers can be subject to cost
shifting.212 In the context of an NGO claim, perhaps the most
pressing concerns are that the involvement of such a financier
would tilt the scales toward seeking pecuniary damages as opposed to nonpecuniary remedies that otherwise the NGO would
prefer (if they are available) and, relatedly, whether the same
calculus that makes pursuing such claims uneconomical for most
NGOs because of the modest level of any monetary damages
available would also make such claims unattractive to most financiers. Because of these concerns, an NGO likely would have
to identify a financier motivated at least in part by political or
ideological reasons in order to obtain such financing (as was the

note 208; Mac Margolis, Big Tobacco Gets Crushed by Tiny Uruguay, BLOOMBERG VIEW (July 18, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-07
-18/big-tobacco-gets-crushed-by-tiny-uruguay.
210. See Funnekotter et al. v. Republic of Zim., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/6,
Award, ¶¶ 1, 148 (Apr. 22, 2009), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case
-documents/ita0349.pdf; Alan Beattie & Luke Peterson, Farmers Use Tribunal
To Tackle Harare, FIN. TIMES, June 27, 2007, at 10; Augustine Mukaro, Dutch
Farmers Put Zim Land Reform on Trial, ZIMBABWE INDEP. (July 1, 2005),
https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2005/07/01/dutch-farmers-put-zim-land
-reform-on-trial; Peterson, supra note 208; Damon Vis-Dunbar, Tribunal Orders
Compensation in Dutch Farmers’ Claims Against Zimbabwe, INV. TREATY NEWS
(Apr. 28, 2009), https://www.iisd.org/itn/2009/04/28/tribunal-orders
-compensation-in-dutch-farmers-claims-against-zimbabwe.
211. See Wyre Davies, Michael Bloomberg Fights Big Tobacco in Uruguay,
BBC NEWS (Apr. 7, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america
-32199250; Peterson, supra note 208; Statement by Michael R. Bloomberg on
Philip Morris International v. Uruguay Decision (July 8, 2016), https://www
.mikebloomberg.com/news/statement-by-michael-r-bloomberg-on-philip-morris
-international-v-uruguay-decision.
212. Gaukrodger & Gordon, supra note 96, at 39–42.
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case in the two known instances where an NGO served as a
third-party financier).213
A variation on this approach would be for a group of similarly situated NGOs operating in the same country to pool their
resources to fund a single claim by one of their members. Such
an approach has the advantage of possibly avoiding disagreements over the remedies to pursue, although conflicts on this
point and other aspects of the claim might still arise between the
NGOs provided the funding. There are, however, significant barriers to this test case approach as noted previously, including
that the claim would not create a binding precedent, even if successful, and the fact that the financial resources needed to pursue a given claim may be beyond the reach of even a relatively
large group of NGOs.214 (For similar reasons establishing some
type of captive insurance arrangement to fund such claims would
also be difficult.)
Lastly, clarifying the rules regarding cost-shifting based on
the final resolution of a dispute would reduce some of the uncertainty regarding both whether a prevailing claimant will have to
bear its own costs and whether a losing claimant faces a significant risk of bearing the costs of the defendant host country. 215
However, there is still substantial uncertainty regarding the
likelihood of prevailing, especially in the NGO context, particularly given the jurisdictional issues discussed previously, as well
as the burden of bearing the financial costs while the dispute is
being resolved even if there is a strong prospect of recovering
those costs if the NGO prevails. So such clarification likely would
not significantly reduce the possible financial costs to an NGO
as long as the jurisdictional uncertainties are still significant.
Furthermore, any clarification in the direction of increased feeshifting could increase the possible costs, given the uncertain
success of any cross-border funding of NGOs claim. Finally, if
much of the costs are waived or eliminated through pro bono assistance, there would be limited costs available for shifting even
in the event of a successful claim.

213. See supra notes 208–11 and accompanying text.
214. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
215. Franck, supra note 175, at 844; Smith, supra note 175, at 750.
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2. Addressing the Costs of International Arbitration for NGOs
There may be, however, ways to reduce the costs of international arbitration specifically for NGOs that could be more effective. 216 One way would be for the ICSID to waive its initial
$25,000 fee and to encourage arbitrators and others paid pursuant to ICSID’s fee schedules to either waive their fees or to accept
significantly reduced fees because of the nature of the claimant.
Such a change would not require amendment of the numerous
existing investment treaties, but could be made instead by ICSID and thus applicable to all arbitrations under its rules. More
specifically, the current fee structure exists under ICSID Administrative and Financial Regulations 14 and 16, which grant the
ICSID Secretary-General the authority to set the fees. 217 With
respect to the fee rate for arbitrators and other members of decision-making bodies, the approval of the President of the World
Bank, in their role as the Chairman of the ICSID Administrative
Council, would also be needed.218 It is not clear, however,
whether this authority extends to setting different fee rates
based on the nature of the claimant or whether instead the ICSID Administrative Council would need to modify the applicable
Administrative and Financial Regulations (pursuant to ICSID
Convention Article 6(1)(a)). 219 There is also the related issue of
whether the fees should also be adjusted for the defendant host
countries when a claim is brought by an NGO, particularly since
their fees could be shifted to the NGO if the defendant host country prevails.
Because the UNCITRAL Rules and other commonly used arbitration rules do not specify a fee structure (beyond limiting fees
to those that are reasonable) and are administered by a number
of organizations, it would be more difficult to seek such financial
accommodations for arbitrations bought by NGOs under those
other sets of rules. 220 This is a concern in part because of the
possible additional jurisdictional hurdle under the ICSID rules
216. These proposals mirror in part suggestions by others concerned with
access to international arbitration in this context for parties with limited financial resources. See, e.g., Caplan, supra note 167, at 307–10 (discussing small and
medium-sized enterprises).
217. Int’l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes (ICSID), Administrative and
Financial Regulations, in ICSID CONVENTION, REGULATIONS AND RULES 60–
62, regs. 14(1), 16 (2006), https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/
2006%20CRR_English-final.pdf.
218. See id. at 60, reg. 14(1); ICSID Convention, supra note 129, art. 5.
219. See ICSID Convention, supra note 129, art. 6(1)(a).
220. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
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mentioned previously that does not appear to be present under
other sets of rules, and so NGOs might prefer these other sets of
rules, when available. 221 Such accommodation could nevertheless be sought by approaching the various private bodies that
offer (for a fee) to appoint arbitrators and provide administrative
services in order to resolve international investor disputes pursuant to these rules.
Finally, ICSID and other arbitration facilities may be unwilling to grant such waivers even if it would be possible to do
so, both because it could make them appear biased toward one
party and because it would open the door for waiver requests
from other financially strapped parties, such as small and medium-sized enterprises and less developed countries.
As noted previously, on average the bulk of costs for arbitration of for-profit investor disputes do not stem from the fees
charged by the bodies that facilitate arbitration and the costs of
the arbitrators themselves; rather the vast majority of such costs
represent the legal and expert fees charged by the individuals
and firms that assist the parties to such arbitrations.222 Any attempt to significantly reduce those costs must therefore also take
these legal and expert fees into account. One NGO-specific option for doing so would be to encourage law firms and experts
engaged in these disputes to grant their services on a pro bono
basis to the NGO, which may be particularly attractive if they
support the NGO’s goals or are troubled by the legal restrictions
on cross-border funding that the NGO is challenging. Given the
relative size and expertise of the legal and expert community for
international commercial arbitrations—dozens of major law
firms now have international arbitration practices—it should be
possible to match at least some potential NGO claimants with
favorably inclined lawyers and experts.223 Such pro bono service
may be particularly attractive as a counter to accusations that
these lawyers and experts are enriching themselves to the detriment of host countries. 224 Such service also is in step with the

221. See supra notes 141–43 and accompanying text.
222. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
223. See Best Law Firms for International Arbitration - Commercial, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., http://bestlawfirms.usnews.com/search.aspx?practice_
area_id=48 (last visited Dec. 5, 2017).
224. See generally BUXTON ET AL., supra note 197 (describing the reasoning
behind such accusations).
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growing calls for all lawyers to provide pro bono services, particularly by the courts in New York where many of these practices
are based. 225
There likely would, however, be some significant obstacles
to this pro bono approach. First, taking on one or more such
claims could create potential conflicts of interest that could prevent the lawyers and experts involved from taking on other, paying clients (including any host countries involved). Second, even
if no technical conflicts of interest arose, lawyers and experts
might be hesitant to get involved in NGO disputes on a pro bono
basis because by doing so they may risk both alienating the potential host country or for-profit investor clients and opening the
door to requests from some of those clients for reduced or waived
fees. Third, given the many complex legal issues relating to such
disputes, there likely would be many hours of work required. Finally, the increasing financial demands placed on law firms, as
well as the likely sensitivity of willingness to provide pro bono
assistance to the changing economic fortunes of such firms, may
more than outweigh the pressure from the increasing calls for
lawyers to provide additional pro bono services.
Even with these caveats, the NGO-specific proposals appear
to have more promise, as compared to the more general cost
strategies, to significantly reduce the cost barrier for an NGO to
pursue a challenge to burdensome legal restrictions on cross-border funding under an investment treaty. Pursuing these proposals would still require significant effort, however, both to generate a cadre of pro bono lawyers and experts in a legal space
where such a group has not existed before and to persuade ICSID and other arbitration facilities to waive or reduce their fees
in this context. An NGO pursuing such a claim would also likely
have to cover some costs, even if it received most services on a
pro bono basis, such as travel expenses for the arbitrators, lawyers, and any experts involved, and so would need to have or secure the financial resources to do so. And, of course, this approach assumes that the jurisdictional hurdles discussed
previously are surmountable, at least under many, if not most,
investment treaties, and the potential monetary damages are
significant enough to make the effort worthwhile even with reduced costs. Finally, using investment treaties in this fashion

225. The Legal Profession - Pro Bono: Overview, N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT
SYSTEM, https://www.nycourts.gov/attorneys/probono/index.shtml (last updated Dec. 31, 2015).
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could lead to host country responses that could limit or neutralize any protections obtained for cross-border funding of NGOs,
including pursuit of other means of restricting such funding (or
domestic NGOs more generally) that are less likely to fall under
such treaties and even renegotiation of those treaties to explicitly exclude such funding from protection.
It is therefore far from clear that existing investment treaties would be sufficient to counter the increasing restrictions on
cross-border funding for NGOs, even if the cost concerns identified here could be overcome. It is therefore necessary to consider
a more ambitious option in case using existing investment treaties to protect cross-border funding of NGOs proves not to be feasible.
B. PROSPECTS FOR CREATING A DISTINCT PROTECTION REGIME
FOR CROSS-BORDER FUNDING OF NGOS
It was far from a given that the growing web of investment
treaties would come into existence, and indeed the magnitude of
its growth has been characterized as both “radical” 226 and “remarkable.” 227 This is in part because, unlike previous international commercial treaties and early bilateral investment treaties, more recent investment treaties generally give investors—
not just the state parties to the treaties—the right to bring
claims against a state party pursuant to compulsory arbitration
without the involvement of the investor’s home-country government and without the necessity of exhausting domestic remedies. 228 This was a significant change, because by providing an
effective way for investors to directly resolve disputes through
international arbitration with host countries, these treaties removed the need for investors to either have their claims placed
on the diplomatic agendas of the countries involved or to exhaust

226. Choi, supra note 83, at 731.
227. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Brief History of International Investment
Agreements, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 157, 157 (2005); Yackee, supra
note 104, at 405; Diel-Gligor, supra note 140, at 677.
228. O. Thomas Johnson Jr. & Jonathan Gimblett, From Gunboats to BITs:
The Evolution of Modern International Investment Law, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY 2010–2011, at 649, 679 (Karl P.
Savant ed., 2011); Choi, supra note 83, at 737; Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy
Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law
Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1537–38 (2005);
Vandevelde, supra note 227, at 175.
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host country domestic court remedies. 229 The ability to avoid going to domestic courts is particularly attractive to investors, because they tended to view such courts as not being impartial, as
being bound by domestic laws that disfavored foreign investors,
and as often lacking the technical expertise required to resolve
complex investment disputes. 230 This change was particularly
striking because it was only possible with the consent of the
states involved, usually obtained on a bilateral basis, although
some multilateral investment treaties now exist. 231
Could the factors that led to many states entering into such
agreements, despite initial hostility because of the loss of sovereignty they represented, have parallels in the context of crossborder funding of NGOs, such that similar momentum could be
created for a distinct and accessible set of legal protections for
such funding under bilateral and multilateral treaties? To consider such a possibility first requires a general understanding of
how the existing web of investment treaties came into existence.
1. Key Factors Supporting Creation of Investment Treaties
While many factors played into the positive shift in attitude
of most, although not all, countries toward investment treaties,
consideration of the history of international law relating to foreign direct investment reveals two critical examples that came
together in the late twentieth century to begin, and then maintain, the surge in modern investment treaties. Those critical factors are host country demand and investor demand, with the latter stemming in large part from the perceived inadequacy of
other approaches for protecting foreign direct investment and
the viability of the international arbitration approach to dispute
resolution that is now incorporated in almost all investment
treaties. 232
Host Country Demand: A combination of the collapse of communism as an ideological force, the economic successes of Asian
developing countries that embraced a capitalist model, and a
growing view in developing countries that strong economic de-

229. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 99, at 1–2; Johnson Jr. & Gimblett, supra note 228, at 650; Vandevelde, supra note 227, at 175.
230. Choi, supra note 83, at 735.
231. For examples of the existing multilateral treaties that provide foreign
direct investment protection, see supra note 104.
232. See Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Emerging Global Regime for Investment,
51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 427, 436–44 (2010).
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velopment requires foreign direct investment led many developing-country governments to pursue investment treaties in the
last quarter of the twentieth century, albeit with some reservations. 233 For example, beginning in the 1980s even Latin American states that had been the most steadfast in their opposition
to developing country views relating to protecting foreign investments, began entering into BITs and acceding to the ICSID Convention, although more recently they have been expressing some
reservations regarding international arbitration.234 This shift in
views was also driven in part during the 1980s by the international debt crisis and the reduced availability of financial aid
from developed country governments, thereby increasing competition for the remaining significant source of foreign capital: foreign direct investment.235 While not all commentators agree
with this explanation, there is general agreement that individual host countries felt pressure to compete with each other in
agreeing to protections for foreign direct investments, even
though collectively they resisted efforts to impose such protections on a multilateral basis. 236 This pressure may have arisen
in part by an impression that home countries would treat host
countries and their economic interests, including exports, more
favorably if an investment treaty was in place. 237 The groundwork for this demand was also arguably laid by the wholesale
unwinding of many previous foreign investments, made under
colonial and pre-communist governments, through mass expropriations in the post–World War II era (especially relating to
control of natural resources) and the subsequent diplomatic resolution of claims arising out of those expropriations. 238
Investor Demand: At the same time, the increasing globalization of business activities and interests in the second half of
the twentieth century led to increasing demands by investors
233. UNCTAD 2016, supra note 104, at ch. 4; NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 99, at 48; Franck, supra note 228, at 1527; Johnson Jr. & Gimblett,
supra note 228, at 687–88; Vandevelde, supra note 227, at 171, 177–79, 183,
193; Diel-Gligor, supra note 140, at 677.
234. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 99, at 50–51.
235. Id. at 48; Choi, supra note 83, at 733; Salacuse, supra note 232, at 441;
Vandevelde, supra note 227, at 177–78.
236. Andrew T. Guzman, Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment
Treaties, in THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES, AND INVESTMENT
FLOWS 73, 83 (Karl P. Sauvant & Lisa E. Sachs eds., 2009).
237. Salacuse, supra note 232, at 442.
238. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 99, at 18–19, 34; Choi, supra note
83, at 733; Johnson Jr. & Gimblett, supra note 228, at 661–67, 686, 690.
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that their home countries enter into investment treaties that
protect their foreign investments, especially in the wake of mass
expropriations earlier in the twentieth century. 239 For example,
in the 1970s lobbying by the business community in the United
States led to the launch by the U.S. government of its BIT program in 1977.240 More recently, investors in developing countries
have begun to make significant foreign investments, leading to
an increasing number of BITs between developing countries, as
opposed to BITs that follow the previously dominant pattern of
being between developed and developing countries.241 These
pressures may have not only made home countries agreeable to
entering into investment treaties, but also may have led to those
countries conditioning other benefits to host countries, such as
government aid or loans from multilateral development institutions, on having an acceptable investment treaty in place.242
This investor demand was driven by the fact that in the
years prior to the growth in modern investment treaties existing
international law was generally seen as inadequate to protect
foreign direct investments. 243 This perception arose in large part
because of sharply divergent views between developed and developing countries regarding the appropriate level of protection
for such investments under customary international law, as exemplified by the U.N. Declaration of the New International Economic Order and the U.N. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States in the 1970s, as well as earlier disputes between
these two types of countries. 244 Attempts to develop a broad multilateral agreement to protect such investments also foundered
on these differences despite repeated attempts. 245 At the same
time, the nineteenth century’s diplomatic-protection approach,
which relied on the use of not only diplomatic pressure but also
239. Jeswald W. Salacuse, BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment
Treaties and Their Impact on Foreign Investment in Developing Countries, 24
INT’L LAW. 655, 659 (1990); Vandevelde, supra note 227, at 171; Diel-Gligor,
supra note 140, at 677.
240. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 99, at 47.
241. Id. at 63; Vandevelde, supra note 227, at 182–83.
242. Yackee, supra note 104, at 462.
243. See Salacuse, supra note 232, at 437–40.
244. UNCTAD 2016, supra note 104, at 121–23; Salacuse, supra note 232, at
437; Vandevelde, supra note 227, at 166–70.
245. UNCTAD 2016, supra note 104, at 123; NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra
note 99, at 19–22, 41, 55–56; Born, supra note 99, at 833; Salacuse, supra note
239, at 660; Megan Wells Sheffer, Bilateral Investment Treaties: A Friend or Foe
to Human Rights?, 39 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 483, 485–86 (2011); Vandevelde,
supra note 227, at 191–92.
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military force to protect the property of investors in foreign countries, became less useful—both because of the necessity of home
country involvement that was tempered by other national concerns and the growing rejection of using military force for such
purposes. 246 Finally, other means of protecting foreign direct investment, including host country domestic laws and investment
contracts, were not seen as sufficient by investors. 247
At the same time, international arbitration began to gain a
reputation as a successful way to resolve investor-state disputes,
particularly through the oil concession agreement cases and the
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal’s decisions; international arbitration’s development was further aided by treaties, such as the
1958 New York Convention and the 1965 ICSID Convention,
that facilitated such arbitration and ensured the ability of prevailing investors to enforce arbitration results in national
courts. 248 The fact that these treaties established procedural
rules and gave binding effect to arbitration results without having to resolve the long-standing dispute over the appropriate
level of protection for foreign direct investments as against hostcountry governments made this approach more feasible than a
broad multilateral agreement incorporating such substantive
standards.
It is important to note that this history is measured in decades and so reflects much broader political and economic developments across that time period, including the emergence of
many countries from colonial rule and the end of the Cold War,
with the collapse of communism. 249 It is also important to note
that the current investment-treaties web is not without its critics, not only with respect to some of the details of those treaties

246. Johnson Jr. & Gimblett, supra note 228, at 664–65.
247. Salacuse, supra note 232, at 438–39; Yackee, supra note 104, at 456.
248. UNCTAD 2016, supra note 104, at 122; NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra
note 99, at 24–29, 39; Born, supra note 99, at 858–59; Johnson Jr. & Gimblett,
supra note 228, at 682–85; Vandevelde, supra note 227, at 174–75.
249. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 99, at ch. 1; Johnson Jr. & Gimblett, supra note 228; Vandevelde, supra note 227, at 193–94. Some commentators emphasize some of these factors over others. See, e.g., NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 99, at 48–49 (attributing the growth of international
investment agreements primarily to the triumph of economic liberalism because
of the Asian countries’ success and the inadequacy of other sources of capital for
developing countries); Vandevelde, supra note 227, at 177–78 (attributing the
growth of BITs primarily to the victory of market ideology and the loss of alternatives to foreign direct investment as a source of capital).
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but also with respect to whether those treaties in fact have increased the level of foreign direct investment, 250 or unduly favor
developed-world business interests over the interests of host
country populations. 251 For this reason, many countries and international organizations are actively considering how the existing global international-investment-agreement regime should be
reformed, and a small number of countries have chosen to terminate existing investment treaties. 252 Not coincidentally and as
noted previously, the growth in such treaties has slowed. 253 Nevertheless, the large and still growing number of such treaties
demonstrates their now established and important role in international commercial law. 254
2. Key Factors Supporting Creation of Cross-Border Funding
Protection
Do similar factors potentially exist in the context of crossborder funding of NGOs? If so, could they generate sufficient momentum to create viable formal legal dispute mechanisms to protect such funding? And what form should such mechanisms
take? For example, should they be incorporated into existing and
new investment treaties, other existing agreements such as regional human rights treaties, or new bilateral and multilateral
agreements? At the risk of over-generalizing, given the enormous variety of host countries and NGOs, it is possible to give
some initial thought to these questions.
Host Country Demand: The spread of burdensome legal restrictions on cross-border funding of NGOs indicates that many
host-country governments see little domestic demand or national need to agree to a formal legal regime that would allow for
challenges to such restrictions. As Oonagh Breen has detailed,
such governments tend to base such restrictions on the concept
of “host country ownership” of both development and political
250. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 99, at 62–63; LUKE ERIC PETERSON, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES AND
DEVELOPMENT POLICY-MAKING 9–10 (2004); Vandevelde, supra note 227, at

184–87; Jason Webb Yackee, Bilateral Investment Treaties, Credible Commitment, and the Rule of (International) Law: Do BITs Promote Foreign Direct Investment?, 42 L. & SOC’Y REV. 805 (2008).
251. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 99, at 63–64; Born, supra note 99,
at 842.
252. UNCTAD 2015, supra note 177, at 120, 124; UNCTAD 2016, supra note
104, at 101–02; Born, supra note 99, at 844.
253. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 103–05 and accompanying text.
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agendas, an assertion of sovereignty that has much in common
with historical developing country objections, based on the supremacy of host country domestic law, to developed country
views of required foreign investment protections. 255 While economic realities, shifting views regarding the benefits of markets,
and competition among host countries for foreign direct investment eventually overcame those objections in most host countries with respect to foreign investments, there do not appear to
be similar forces emerging that would overcome these views in
the context of cross-border funding of NGOs. As Moore and
Rutzen have acknowledged, securing political will for a treaty to
help promote global philanthropy, including protections for
cross-border funding, would “be a formidable challenge.”256 This
is almost certainly an understatement, even though some host
countries have joined voluntary, nonbinding international efforts that include a commitment to protecting the ability of
NGOs to operate in ways consistent with freedom of association,
such as the Open Government Partnership, which currently has
seventy-five participating countries, and the Community of Democracies.257 Furthermore, the current skepticism in some circles regarding the positive effects of BITs and other treaties, as
evidenced not only by the reconsideration of existing investment
treaties in some countries but also the decision by the United
States to abandon the Trans-Pacific Partnership, does not bode
well for the prospects of creating a new international treaty regime relating to NGOs.258
One possible way to address this lack of host country demand would be to gather data regarding the positive effects of
such funding on initiatives that tend to be important to host
countries, such as disaster relief and development assistance.
255. Breen, supra note 27, at 64.
256. Moore & Rutzen, supra note 24, at 39.
257. See Mission Statement, CMTY. OF DEMOCRACIES, http://www
.community-democracies.org/values/mission-statement (last visited Dec. 5,
2017) (“Supporting and defending civil society in all countries.”); Open Government Declaration, OPEN GOV’T P’SHIP (Sept. 2011), https://www
.opengovpartnership.org/open-government-declaration (“We commit to protecting the ability of not-for-profit and civil society organizations to operate in ways
consistent with our commitment to freedom of expression, association, and opinion.”).
258. See, e.g., KARL P. SAUVANT & FEDERICO ORTINO, IMPROVING THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY REGIME: OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 38–40 (2013), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2014/03/Improving-The
-International-Investment-Law-and-Policy-Regime-Options-for-the-Future
-Sept-2013.pdf; supra note 252 and accompanying text.
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This effort could take advantage of both the growing systematic
consideration of development aid and the increasing profile of
such aid given the U.N. Millennium Development Goals and
other similar international efforts. 259 Some such efforts are already underway, but gathering these data will be costly and time
consuming, with no guarantee that the results would make a
strong enough case to convince many host countries to surrender
some of their control over the legal rules governing cross-border
funding of domestic NGOs (especially at a time when some of
those countries are questioning the wisdom of their investment
treaty commitments). 260 There also do not appear to be any obvious parallels to the “Asian tigers” that so strongly made the
case for economic liberalism. 261
Cross-Border Funder Demand: On the surface, there appears to be significant interest among cross-border funders in
such protections (if they are affordable), given the relatively high
profile that the lack of such protections has recently attained in
media reports and elsewhere. In 2015, however, Carothers observed that many such funders have only begun to consider how
to address the increasing legal restrictions on such funding and
collectively their overall response “is still not very strong.” 262
Perhaps not surprisingly, many funders were at that point only
focused on working out their specific problems with particular
governments and not broader policy responses. 263 He also noted
that divisions within the funding community have weakened its
ability to respond and to coalesce around any given approach. 264
This appears to still be the case, even though there have been
some attempts at creating a unified voice, such as The Civic
Space Initiative sponsored by four international NGOs concerned about this issue and, beginning in 2017, the Funders’ Initiative for Civil Society.265 Absent a relatively strong and unified voice on this issue, it seems unlikely that the home countries
259. Breen, supra note 27, at 49–50; see also James McGann & Mary Johnstone, The Power Shift and the NGO Credibility Crisis, 11 BROWN J. WORLD
AFF. 159 (2005) (highlighting the positive effects of international NGOs, but
criticizing their lack of transparency and accountability).
260. See supra notes 17–20 and accompanying text.
261. See Kimutai Gilbert, Who Are the Four Asian Tigers?, WORLDATLAS,
http://www.worldatlas.com/articles/who-are-the-four-asian-tigers.html (last updated June 5, 2017).
262. CAROTHERS, supra note 24, at 24.
263. Id. at 24–25.
264. Id. at 25–27.
265. See Funders’ Initiative for Civil Society, GLOB. DIALOGUE FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS & SOC. CHANGE, http://global-dialogue.eu/funders-initiative-for-civil
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for cross-border funders will be particularly inclined to make negotiating such protections with host countries a high or even significant diplomatic priority. One necessary step for pursuing this
approach will therefore be to continue to increase the communication with and among funders regarding these increasing restrictions and possible responses, in order to develop that voice.
Whether such communication would be sufficient to overcome
the tendency of funders to focus on their particular situations
and the collective action difficulties in developing such a voice
remains to be seen, however. 266
If cross-border funders can speak with a sufficiently unified
voice, as investors did when pushing for investment treaties,
they may also be able to successfully argue that the desired protections are in the long-run self-interest of their home countries.
In this context, that self-interest is not primarily economic, but
instead is about ensuring stability in host countries and thus reducing risks of creating unstable or failed states, and the potential dangers to other countries that can result from such
states.267 Convincing home countries that restrictions on crossborder funding of NGOs (and other restrictions on host-country
NGOs) is not only a human rights and democracy issue but also
a national security issue will not necessarily be an easy or quick
task, however, especially given antiterrorism concerns that host
countries often use to justify such restrictions. 268
It also has not yet been demonstrated that the time and effort required to lay the groundwork for new international agreements is necessary to sufficiently protect cross-border funding of
NGOs. For the reasons already discussed, it appears existing international law does not provide a sufficiently robust legal regime for successfully challenging legal restrictions on such funding. 269 What is less clear is if the workarounds that many
funders have pursued to address such restrictions are inadequate to protect most such funding and whether domestic and
international campaigns to influence the lawmakers in host
countries will be inadequate as well. 270 While in some countries
-society (last visited Dec. 5, 2017) (describing a collaborative program funded by
eleven international donors to respond to the closing of civic space launched in
2017); The Civic Space Initiative, INT’L CTR. FOR NOT-FOR-PROFIT L., http://
www.icnl.org/csi (last visited Dec. 5, 2017).
266. CAROTHERS, supra note 24, at 24–27.
267. See, e.g., CAROTHERS, supra note 60, at 3–5.
268. See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text.
269. See supra Part I.B.
270. See CAROTHERS, supra note 24, at 11–23.
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that have been the most aggressive in their efforts, such as
Egypt, these alternative measures appear to have been insufficient, it is uncertain how widespread that lack of effectiveness
is. 271 The fact that most of these workaround efforts are of recent
vintage (and public information regarding them is limited) hinders any such evaluation. It does appear to be too early, however,
to write off these alternative approaches in favor of what would
almost certainly be a complex and therefore costly and time-consuming pursuit of new international agreements that could very
well not succeed. As noted previously, it took several decades for
it to become clear that other means of protecting investments,
including negotiating a broad multilateral agreement, were not
viable. 272
Finally, consideration has to be given to whether creating
agreements that parallel the existing investment treaty structure, including using international arbitration as the formal legal dispute mechanism, is a viable one in the cross-border funding of NGOs context. For the cost reasons previously discussed,
international arbitration may not be a practical option in this
context, especially if the strategies discussed above to address
these costs are found to not be feasible.273 A mechanism that instead relies on member state, not party, funding may then be a
better option. This consideration would also need to include what
is the best vehicle for such agreements—for example, existing
investment treaties, existing regional human rights agreements
(with their existing dispute resolution mechanisms), or new,
stand-alone bilateral or multilateral treaties. With respect to the
second option, there is currently pending a case brought by
eleven Russian NGOs challenging restrictions on cross-border
funding of NGOs under the European Convention on Human
Rights (Ecodefense, Golos, and Other NGOs v. Russia).274 That
271.
272.
273.
274.

See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
See supra Part IV.A.2.
See NORWEGIAN HELSINKI COMM., RUSSIA’S FOREIGN AGENT LAW: VIOLATING HUMAN RIGHTS AND ATTACKING CIVIL SOCIETY 6, 8 n.5 (2014), http://
www.nhc.no/filestore/Publikasjoner/Policy_Paper/NHC_PolicyPaper_6_2014_
Russiasforeignagentlaw.pdf; Antoine Buyse, Two High Profile Russian Cases
Coming to Strasbourg, ECHR BLOG (Feb. 8, 2013, 10:57 AM), http://echrblog
.blogspot.com/2013/02/two-high-profile-russian-cases-coming.html (describing
this case). In another example of a regional body being the vehicle for challenging such restrictions, the European Commission has begun the process for determining whether Hungary’s new law restricting NGOs is inconsistent with
that country’s European Union commitments. See European Commission Press
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case may provide a good test regarding whether the existing provisions of this regional human rights agreement are sufficient to
successfully challenge such restrictions and therefore whether
they are a viable protection with respect to the countries that are
part of this agreements; if they prove to be, expanding the reach
of such treaties may be the best way to protect cross-border funding of NGOs.
*****

The relative success of international commercial law, particularly investment treaties, when it comes to protecting foreign
investments may be difficult to translate to the cross-border
funding of NGOs context. Even given that many existing investment treaties may apply to such funding, that application is not
without doubt; the current financial costs of invoking that protection are too high for all but the wealthiest NGOs; and reputational and principles costs may further limit or even effectively
eliminate NGO access to those protections. There may, however,
be ways to address those costs for NGOs by urging arbitration
institutions, lawyers, and experts to waive or sharply reduce
their fees for claims brought by such entities, or by seeking third
party financing. Whether the successful pursuit of some such
claims would lead to improved behavior on the part of host countries or instead a backlash that would generate new restrictions
or narrowed treaty provisions is unclear, however.
As for instead pursuing new agreements to protect crossborder funding by NGOs, the history of investment treaties indicates that a confluence of factors is needed to make doing so possible by generating sufficient host country demand (or at least
grudging acceptance of the need for such protections) and sufficient cross-border funder demand driven by a lack of adequate
other options. While it has been at least a decade since observers
began highlighting these restrictions, the momentum for the
current investment treaties took several decades to grow, and it
seems likely that would be the case in the cross-border funding
of NGOs context as well. This time is necessary because of the
need to develop a case for protecting such funding that would be
persuasive to host countries, the lack of a current consensus
among funders regarding how to proceed, the need to determine
whether less costly and time-consuming alternatives exist, and
Release IP/17/1982, Infringements–Hungary: Commission Launches Infringement Procedure for Law on Foreign-Funded NGOs (July 13, 2017), http://
europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1982_en.htm.
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the need to determine what approach holds the most promise for
resolving funder-state disputes in conformity with international
law. It may also be necessary to wait for the current rise in nationalist sentiments and related general hostility to international agreements to wane. In other words, much work remains
to be done and a significant amount of time may need to pass
before the best approach for combatting these restrictions can be
determined and sufficient support for that approach generated
if using existing investment treaties is not feasible.
In the meantime, and particularly if invoking the protections of international investment treaties proves impractical because of the obstacles to doing so, both the recipients and providers of cross-border funding for NGOs will need to consider
alternate approaches to countering the growing restrictions on
such funding. The final part of this Article addresses those alternate approaches.
V. COUNTRY-SPECIFIC STRATEGIES FOR RESISTING
LEGAL RESTRICTIONS ON CROSS-BORDER FUNDING
It is possible that given enough time and resources, NGOs
facing undue restrictions on their ability to provide and receive
cross-border funding will be able to successfully challenge those
restrictions either under existing investment treaties or under
new agreements specifically designed to protect such funding
and perhaps NGOs more generally. But that is little comfort to
NGOs that currently face such restrictions and the prospect that
those restrictions may cause decades of work to be squandered
or thousands of people to be denied needed assistance. Such
NGOs therefore need to instead consider a variety of ad hoc approaches and to carefully choose the ones that best fit the specific
country and type of restriction they face, some of which were
mentioned previously. 275 In the interests of brevity a full consideration of such approaches has to be deferred to a later day, but
some initial consideration can be given here.
One approach is to try to stop such restrictions before they
even become law, or to fight for their repeal if they are already
in place. For example, the International Center for Not-for-Profit
Law (ICNL) and other NGOs successfully worked together in
Kyrgyzstan to convince the parliament there in 2016 to reject a
275. See supra notes 91–94 and accompanying text. See generally CIVIL
SOC’Y & MEDIA DIV., USAID, STAND WITH CIVIL SOCIETY: BEST PRACTICES
(2014), http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PBAAE863.pdf (discussing strategies to
promote civil society).
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foreign agents law targeting NGOs that mirrored the existing
Russian law discussed previously. 276 ICNL and other international NGOs are usually critical to such efforts, both for identifying legislation of concern in a timely fashion and for providing
resources and needed coordination for opposition efforts. 277
If attempts to stop such restrictions are unsuccessful or the
restrictions of concern are already in place, another possible approach is to challenge the application of such restrictions under
host country domestic law instead of under international law.
For example, Greenpeace in 2015 successfully challenged the application of India’s restrictions on cross-border funding in the Indian courts. 278 The success of such an approach will of course
depend on the strength of the host country legal system and the
rights it provides, as well as likely requiring perseverance in the
face of possibly multiple attempts by a host country to impose
such restrictions; Greenpeace has so far obtained six court judgments in its favor in India. 279
Another option is to try to enlist other countries to bring diplomatic pressure on the host country to reverse or weaken the
restrictions at issue. For example, when Hungary passed legislation in 2017 that appeared designed to shut down Central European University because of its funding and other connections
to George Soros, several top U.S. officials pressured the government to allow the university to continue to operate in its current
form. 280 The pressure appears to have the desired effect, as Hungary’s Minister for State Education then suggested that there
might be a legal loophole that could lead to this result. 281 But
diplomatic pressure is of course not always so successful; for example, both Compassion International in India and Mercy Corps
in Turkey were able to gather some diplomatic support from the
United States in the face of cross-border funding restrictions, but

276. See supra note 92; supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing
Russian law).
277. See, e.g., ICNL ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 92, at 2–9.
278. See supra note 91.
279. See CIVICUS, STATE OF CIVIL SOCIETY REPORT 2016, at 58 (2016),
http://www.civicus.org/documents/reports-and-publications/SOCS/2016/
summaries/SoCS-full-review.pdf.
280. See Helene Bienvenu & Balint Bardi, A Loophole Could Keep Open Soros’s University in Hungary, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2017, at A6.
281. Id.
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at this point it appears both NGOs have still been forced to abandon their operations in these countries. 282 And, of course, other
countries may sometimes send messages that suggest such restrictions are acceptable, even inadvertently, as may have happened when President Donald Trump’s praise of Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi appeared to undermine previous
criticism from other U.S. officials’ of a law pending before President el-Sisi that imposes severe new restrictions on NGOs and
so may have encouraged him to sign that law.283
If lobbying, domestic legal challenges, and diplomacy are either not viable options or prove unsuccessful, it may be possible
for funders and recipients to develop workarounds that successfully avoid the restrictions. 284 As already noted, it appears that
such a workaround may exist for the Central European University in Hungary (as helpfully pointed out by a Hungarian minister in the face of diplomatic pressure). 285 Before enactment of the
most recent set of laws relating to NGOs, a variety of such workarounds were available in China, including registering as a foreign enterprise, opening a domestic project office, or identifying
a domestic NGO to receive program funding from a foreign NGO
as opposed to the foreign NGO itself operating in the country. 286
But as the situation in China demonstrates, such workarounds
are vulnerable to changes in domestic law. 287
A longer-term solution is to develop the capacity of host
country NGOs to attract domestic support so that if and when
restrictions on cross-border funding arise the previously supported host country NGOs can leave such funding (and the restrictions that come with it) behind without unduly compromising their ability to pursue their missions. 288 Such an approach
may also have the benefit of increasing the connections between
282. See Ellen Barry & Suhasini Raj, U.S. To Question India About Ban on
Christian Charity, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/
03/09/world/asia/compassion-international-india.html; DeYoung & Lamothe,
supra note 50.
283. See Walsh, supra note 40.
284. See Anna Berry, Human Rights Nonprofits Under Fire in Civil Society
Crackdowns, NONPROFIT Q. (June 22, 2017), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/
2017/06/22/human-rights-nonprofits-fire-civil-society-crackdowns.
285. See supra notes 280–81 and accompanying text.
286. See Yin, supra note 71, at 539–41.
287. See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text.
288. See Kendra Dupuy et al., Foreign Disentanglement, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV., Fall 2015, at 61, 61 (urging such an approach); Ighobor, supra note
94 (describing such efforts in Africa).
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such NGOs and their country’s populations, thereby improving
legitimacy and relevance. 289
The piecemeal nature of these approaches is a major drawback to them, but unless invoking investment treaty protections
is more promising than appears to be the case or until a more
comprehensive, international effort to secure binding and effective protections for such funding is feasible, these approaches are
the only viable way to counter the increasing restrictions on
cross-border funding of NGOs. Gathering information about
such approaches and refining them may in fact be a useful role
for leading cross-border funders to work collaboratively. If such
efforts prove to be sufficiently successful, then the issues identified in this Article have been addressed; if not, collaboration on
this more manageable task could lay the groundwork for a more
ambitious effort to address these restrictions.
CONCLUSION
The promise of investment treaties to counter burdensome
legal restrictions on cross-border funding of NGOs is currently a
hollow one for most, if not all, providers and recipients of such
funding, because of the significant hurdles to successfully invoking those treaties and the prohibitively high financial costs and
possible other high costs of doing so. That promise may be salvageable if the arbitration facilities, arbitrators, lawyers, and experts whose fees drive those high costs could be convinced to donate their services when the claimant is an NGO challenging
such restrictions or if third-party financing sources could be
identified for such claims. Absent such efforts and subsequent
success in invoking these protections, however, the prospects for
developing new international agreements to create a viable legal
mechanism for challenging such restrictions are not currently
very bright, given the lack of a consensus among cross-border
funders for doing so, the lack of host country recognition of the
importance of such funding for development and other issues of
national importance, the limited track record for other approaches for dealing with such restrictions, and the uncertainty
289. See SARAH E. MENDELSON, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES, WHY
GOVERNMENTS TARGET CIVIL SOCIETY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE IN RESPONSE:
A NEW AGENDA 5–6 (2015), https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/
legacy_files/files/publication/150422_Mendelson_GovTargetCivilSociety_Web
.pdf; Kendra Dupuy et al., Across the Globe, Governments Are Cracking Down
on Civic Organizations. This Is Why., WASH. POST: MONKEY CAGE (July 5,
2017), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/07/05/__
trashed-4.
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regarding the best model for such agreements. At a minimum,
and if the history of investment treaties is any guide, it will take
many years to change these facts so that such new agreements
have a realistic possibility of being accepted by both home countries and host countries. In the meantime, less ambitious strategies such as pursuing domestic law remedies and other means
of relaxing or avoiding these new restrictions likely hold more
promise for NGOs directly affected by these new restrictions
than pursuing the uncertain hope that investment treaties can
protect such funding.

